{"id":105,"date":"2026-04-21T12:00:00","date_gmt":"2026-04-21T12:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/california.shuster.info\/?p=105"},"modified":"2026-04-21T12:00:00","modified_gmt":"2026-04-21T12:00:00","slug":"shoshone-bannock-tribes-usdoi-flpma-land-exchange-1900-act-en-banc-denial","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/california.shuster.info\/?p=105","title":{"rendered":"Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. U.S. Department of the Interior \u2014 Ninth Circuit denies en banc rehearing in dispute over BLM land exchange involving 1900 ceded reservation lands, leaving panel ruling for the tribes intact"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Case<\/dt>\n
Shoshone-Bannock Tribes of the Fort Hall Reservation v. USDOI<\/dd>\n
Court<\/dt>\n
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals<\/dd>\n
Date Decided<\/dt>\n
2026-04-21<\/dd>\n
Docket No.<\/dt>\n
23-35543<\/dd>\n
Status<\/dt>\n
Reported \/ Citable<\/dd>\n
Topics<\/dt>\n
Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA); Fort Hall Indian Reservation; ceded lands; 1900 Act; Bureau of Land Management; tribal sovereignty; specific-versus-general statutory canon; en banc rehearing<\/dd>\n<\/dl>\n<\/div>\n

Background<\/h2>\n

In 2025, a Ninth Circuit panel sided with the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes of the Fort Hall Reservation in their challenge to a Bureau of Land Management (BLM) land exchange under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA). The disputed exchange involved lands originally ceded by the tribes under a Law of June 6, 1900. That 1900 statute provided that the ceded lands “shall be subject to disposal” only under specified categories of laws, listed in the statute itself.<\/p>\n

The tribes argued that the BLM’s general FLPMA exchange authority did not satisfy the 1900 Act’s “only under specified” restriction. The agency and the corporate intervenor (J.R. Simplot Company) argued that FLPMA, as a later-enacted general law, authorized the exchange notwithstanding the 1900 Act. The district court and the Ninth Circuit panel sided with the tribes, holding that the 1900 Act’s specific limitation controlled and that the FLPMA exchange was therefore unauthorized.<\/p>\n

After the panel decision, both the federal government and Simplot petitioned for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc. The April 21, 2026 order denied both.<\/p>\n

The Court’s Holding<\/h2>\n

The Ninth Circuit denied panel rehearing and rehearing en banc, leaving the panel’s decision for the tribes intact. The order itself is procedurally short, but it is accompanied by substantial dissenting and concurring statements that frame the legal stakes.<\/p>\n

Judge Collins dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc. He would have held that FLPMA’s general authority to conduct land exchanges, codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq., applies to the ceded Fort Hall lands and was not vitiated by the 1900 Act. In his view, the panel majority’s contrary conclusion misapplied the canon that the specific governs the general.<\/p>\n

Judge Tung also dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc, joined by Judges Callahan, Bennett, R. Nelson, Bumatay, and VanDyke. He argued that the 1900 Act and FLPMA can be harmonized: the 1900 Act does not prohibit FLPMA-authorized exchanges, and FLPMA must be given effect. He offered two alternative readings of the 1900 Act — that it precludes disposal under preexisting laws but not later-enacted laws, and that it ensures the lands are used for settlement or productive use — and argued the panel majority misread the statute.<\/p>\n

Judges Friedland and Kennelly issued a statement respecting the denial of rehearing en banc explaining why those alternative readings were not persuasive and reaffirming that the plain text of the 1900 Act prohibited the disputed exchange and that FLPMA neither repealed nor superseded the 1900 Act.<\/p>\n

Key Takeaways<\/h2>\n