{"id":108,"date":"2026-04-27T12:00:00","date_gmt":"2026-04-27T12:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/california.shuster.info\/?p=108"},"modified":"2026-04-27T12:00:00","modified_gmt":"2026-04-27T12:00:00","slug":"in-re-zg-parental-rights-reunification-services-ineffective-counsel","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/california.shuster.info\/?p=108","title":{"rendered":"In re Z.G. \u2014 Juvenile Court Cannot Terminate Parental Rights Based Solely on Adoptability, and Mother’s Lawyer Was Ineffective for Failing to Demand Required Reunification Services"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n
\n
Case<\/dt>\n
In re Z.G.<\/dd>\n
Court<\/dt>\n
Supreme Court<\/dd>\n
Date Decided<\/dt>\n
2026-04-27<\/dd>\n
Docket No.<\/dt>\n
S289430<\/dd>\n
Status<\/dt>\n
Reported \/ Citable<\/dd>\n
Topics<\/dt>\n
juvenile dependency, reunification services, termination of parental rights, ineffective assistance of counsel, permanency planning<\/dd>\n<\/dl>\n<\/div>\n

Background<\/h2>\n

California’s juvenile dependency system tries to balance two competing goals: protecting children from abuse and neglect, and preserving family relationships whenever it is safe to do so. A dependency case proceeds in roughly four stages \u2014 jurisdiction (deciding whether the child is at risk), disposition (deciding whether the child must be removed from the parents), reunification (offering the parents services aimed at fixing the problems and getting the family back together), and permanency (deciding the long-term plan if reunification fails). At the permanency stage, the juvenile court can choose adoption \u2014 which terminates the parents’ legal rights \u2014 or some other plan, like guardianship or long-term foster care.<\/p>\n

This case involves a mother and her two children. Her older child, Z.G., came into the system as an infant in 2020 after testing positive for methamphetamine in an emergency room. The Department of Children and Family Services in San Bernardino County alleged the mother had a substance-abuse problem. The juvenile court removed Z.G. from her parents and ordered the standard reunification services. The mother made progress for a time, but the case eventually moved beyond reunification. Later, the mother had a second child, A.G., and the Department filed a separate dependency petition. As to A.G., the juvenile court terminated reunification services without ever providing them \u2014 even though the mother was statutorily entitled to receive them.<\/p>\n

At the disposition hearing for A.G., the mother’s appointed counsel did not assert her statutory right to reunification services and did not object when the court terminated services and set a permanency planning hearing. The mother filed a notice of intent to challenge that outcome, but trial counsel never followed through with the challenge. The juvenile court ultimately terminated the mother’s parental rights to both children based on findings that they were likely to be adopted. The Court of Appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court granted review to address two issues: whether mere adoptability is enough to terminate parental rights, and whether the mother received effective assistance of counsel.<\/p>\n

The Court’s Holding<\/h2>\n

Justice Liu, writing for a unanimous court, reversed and remanded. The court held first that a finding the children are likely to be adopted is necessary but not sufficient to support termination of parental rights. The dependency statutes contemplate that termination occurs only after a parent has had the opportunity for reunification services and after the court has properly determined that none of the statutory exceptions to termination applies. Skipping past the prerequisites and treating adoptability alone as the basis for termination is legal error. The juvenile court here did exactly that with respect to A.G., for whom no reunification services were ever provided.<\/p>\n

Second, the court held that the mother received ineffective assistance of counsel. Trial counsel in dependency cases must protect the parent’s statutory rights, including the right to reunification services where they are required by law. By failing to assert the mother’s right to services as to A.G., and by then failing to prosecute the challenge to the order terminating services and setting the permanency hearing, counsel fell below the standard of competent dependency representation. Because reunification services are a foundational protection in the dependency scheme, the prejudice was clear: had counsel done his job, the mother would have had the chance the statute guaranteed her, and the case would not have reached the termination stage in the procedural posture that it did.<\/p>\n

The court reversed the order terminating parental rights and remanded the case so that the mother can receive the services she was entitled to and the dependency court can proceed properly from there.<\/p>\n

Key Takeaways<\/h2>\n