{"id":109,"date":"2026-04-21T12:00:00","date_gmt":"2026-04-21T12:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/california.shuster.info\/?p=109"},"modified":"2026-04-21T12:00:00","modified_gmt":"2026-04-21T12:00:00","slug":"mcauliffe-v-robinson-helicopter-gara-rolling-provision-replacement-parts-statute-of-repose","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/california.shuster.info\/?p=109","title":{"rendered":"McAuliffe v. Robinson Helicopter \u2014 Ninth Circuit holds GARA’s rolling 18-year repose period restarts for replacement parts even without substantive alteration, reviving Hawaiian crash family’s wrongful-death suit against Torrance manufacturer"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Case<\/dt>\n
McAuliffe v. Robinson Helicopter Company<\/dd>\n
Court<\/dt>\n
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals<\/dd>\n
Date Decided<\/dt>\n
2026-04-21<\/dd>\n
Docket No.<\/dt>\n
24-6086<\/dd>\n
Status<\/dt>\n
Reported \/ Citable<\/dd>\n
Topics<\/dt>\n
General Aviation Revitalization Act (GARA); 18-year statute of repose; rolling provision; fraud exception; product liability; wrongful death; replacement parts; aviation manufacturing<\/dd>\n<\/dl>\n<\/div>\n

Background<\/h2>\n

Ryan McAuliffe was killed in a helicopter sightseeing crash in Kailua, Hawai‘i. Her parents, Mirna and Thomas McAuliffe, sued Robinson Helicopter Company — a Torrance, California manufacturer — for wrongful death, alleging negligence and strict liability. The case turned on the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA), which bars wrongful-death actions against general aviation manufacturers brought more than 18 years after the aircraft was delivered to the first purchaser.<\/p>\n

Robinson manufactured the original helicopter more than 18 years before the crash, so on its face GARA would seem to bar the suit. But the McAuliffes invoked two GARA carve-outs. First, Section 2(a)(2), the “rolling provision,” restarts the 18-year clock for any new part installed in the aircraft, with respect to causes of action arising from that part. The crash was alleged to have been caused by failures of the main rotor hub and main rotor blades, which Robinson had replaced with identical new parts in 2018 — slightly more than 18 years after the original aircraft delivery, but well within 18 years of the parts replacement. Second, Section 2(b)(1), the “fraud exception,” eliminates the repose period entirely if the manufacturer knowingly misrepresented, concealed, or withheld required material information from the Federal Aviation Administration.<\/p>\n

The U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii granted Robinson summary judgment on both theories. It held the rolling provision did not apply because the replacement rotor hub and blades were identical to the originals (no “substantive alteration”), and that the McAuliffes had not pleaded or shown facts supporting a fraud exception. The McAuliffes appealed.<\/p>\n

The Court’s Holding<\/h2>\n

The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The key holding is that GARA’s rolling provision does not require a plaintiff to show that a replacement part has been “substantively altered” from the original. The plain text of Section 2(a)(2) restarts the 18-year repose clock when a new part is installed, period. There is no statutory requirement that the new part differ in design or performance from what it replaced.<\/p>\n

Because the district court applied the wrong legal standard, its causation analysis (which was tied to the same misreading) had to be redone. The Ninth Circuit therefore reversed summary judgment on the rolling provision and remanded for the district court to reassess causation under the correct framework.<\/p>\n

The court affirmed the district court on the fraud exception. The McAuliffes did not plead with the required particularity, and they failed to offer evidence that Robinson knowingly misrepresented or concealed material information from the FAA. The court also affirmed the denial of leave to amend, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion.<\/p>\n

Judge Friedland dissented in part. She agreed with the majority that the fraud exception failed and that leave to amend was properly denied. But she would have read prior Ninth Circuit precedent to require a material alteration before the rolling provision can restart the clock. Because no material alteration occurred in the replacement parts here, she would have affirmed summary judgment for Robinson in full.<\/p>\n

Key Takeaways<\/h2>\n