{"id":187,"date":"2026-01-20T12:00:00","date_gmt":"2026-01-20T12:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/california.shuster.info\/?p=187"},"modified":"2026-01-20T12:00:00","modified_gmt":"2026-01-20T12:00:00","slug":"harmon-v-superior-court-e086720-public-defender-habeas-discretion","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/california.shuster.info\/?p=187","title":{"rendered":"Harmon v. Superior Court \u2014 Public Defender Has Discretion to Decline Appointment to Habeas Petitioner Under Government Code Section 27706(g)"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Case<\/dt>\n
Harmon v. Superior Court (People, Real Party in Interest)<\/dd>\n
Court<\/dt>\n
4th District Court of Appeal, Division Two<\/dd>\n
Date Decided<\/dt>\n
2026-01-20<\/dd>\n
Docket No.<\/dt>\n
E086720<\/dd>\n
Status<\/dt>\n
Reported \/ Citable<\/dd>\n
Topics<\/dt>\n
Public Defender, Government Code section 27706, Habeas Corpus, Racial Justice Act, Appointment of Counsel<\/dd>\n<\/dl>\n<\/div>\n

Background<\/h2>\n

Taiwan Orran Reed was convicted in 2020 of pimping, pandering, human trafficking, and rape, and was sentenced to a lengthy prison term. In 2024, Reed filed a habeas corpus petition under California’s Racial Justice Act of 2020 (RJA), alleging that the prosecutor and law-enforcement witnesses used racially discriminatory language at his trial \u2014 specifically by referring to him as a ‘gorilla pimp.’ The trial court found a prima facie showing and issued an order to show cause.<\/p>\n

After Reed’s retained counsel withdrew and Reed indicated he could not afford a replacement, the Riverside County Superior Court appointed the Riverside County Public Defender. The Public Defender attempted to decline the appointment. The trial court invoked Government Code section 27706, subdivision (a), which generally requires a public defender to accept appointments unless he can show unavailability, and ordered the Public Defender to represent Reed.<\/p>\n

The Public Defender filed a writ petition challenging the order.<\/p>\n

The Court’s Holding<\/h2>\n

The Court of Appeal granted the writ. Working carefully through Government Code section 27706, the court held that a different subdivision \u2014 section 27706(g) \u2014 governs public-defender representation of habeas petitioners like Reed. Section 27706(g) provides public defenders with discretion to accept or decline such appointments, without any obligation to show unavailability.<\/p>\n

The court explained that section 27706(a)’s mandatory-acceptance rule applies to public-defender appointments in ‘any other proceeding’ enumerated in subdivision (a). Habeas petitions, particularly those involving post-conviction relief like RJA claims, are addressed by section 27706(g), which uses permissive ‘may’ language. Reading the statute as a whole, the Legislature plainly distinguished between the categories of appointments and reserved discretion to public defenders in the habeas context.<\/p>\n

The trial court’s contrary order was therefore incorrect. The court directed the trial court to vacate its order compelling the Public Defender to represent Reed; the trial court must instead appoint alternate counsel.<\/p>\n

Key Takeaways<\/h2>\n