{"id":214,"date":"2026-04-22T12:00:00","date_gmt":"2026-04-22T12:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/california.shuster.info\/?p=214"},"modified":"2026-04-22T12:00:00","modified_gmt":"2026-04-22T12:00:00","slug":"bobo-appellate-division-misdemeanor-vehicular-manslaughter-diversion-section-1001-95","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/california.shuster.info\/?p=214","title":{"rendered":"Bobo v. Appellate Division of Superior Court \u2014 Trial Court Cannot Deny Misdemeanor Vehicular Manslaughter Diversion Based Solely on the Inherent Elements of the Charged Offense"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Case<\/dt>\n
Bobo v. Appellate Division of Superior Court<\/dd>\n
Court<\/dt>\n
4th District Court of Appeal, Division One<\/dd>\n
Date Decided<\/dt>\n
2026-04-22<\/dd>\n
Docket No.<\/dt>\n
D087393<\/dd>\n
Status<\/dt>\n
Reported \/ Citable<\/dd>\n
Topics<\/dt>\n
Penal Code section 1001.95; misdemeanor diversion; vehicular manslaughter; suitability determination; abuse of discretion<\/dd>\n<\/dl>\n<\/div>\n

Background<\/h2>\n

On the evening of November 11, 2024, Aimee Bobo was driving a Ford F-450 truck southbound on Kearny Villa Road in San Diego. A few seconds after the traffic light turned red, she drove through the intersection and struck a Toyota Highlander turning left on a green light from a Route 163 off-ramp. The driver of the Toyota, Mary Donato, was killed. Bobo appeared shocked at the scene and showed no signs of intoxication. She was 50 years old and had no prior criminal record.<\/p>\n

Bobo was charged with misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter under Penal Code section 192(c)(2). Before trial, she requested misdemeanor diversion under Penal Code section 1001.95, the relatively new statute authorizing misdemeanor diversion in California. She submitted character references, family photos, and detailed background information about her upbringing, education, employment, and community ties.<\/p>\n

The trial court found Bobo eligible for misdemeanor diversion (because the charged offense is not on the statutory exclusion list) but denied diversion as a matter of suitability, citing the fact that her negligent conduct caused the death of another person. The appellate division of superior court summarily denied her writ petition. Bobo then sought a writ from the Court of Appeal.<\/p>\n

The Court’s Holding<\/h2>\n

The Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division One, granted the writ. The court held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying diversion based solely on facts inherent in the charged offense.<\/p>\n

Penal Code section 1001.95 authorizes misdemeanor diversion for charges other than specifically excluded offenses. Vehicular manslaughter under section 192(c)(2) is not on the exclusion list, so a defendant charged with that offense is eligible for diversion. Whether to grant diversion to an eligible defendant is committed to the trial court’s discretion based on a suitability evaluation.<\/p>\n

The trial court’s discretion, however, must be guided by the underlying purposes of the diversion statute and based on individualized facts beyond those inherent in the charged offense. Misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter, by definition, requires criminally negligent conduct that causes the death of another person. To deny diversion solely because the offense involved negligence and resulted in death is to deny diversion to every defendant eligible under that statute, effectively reading vehicular manslaughter out of the diversion scheme. The Legislature, having included vehicular manslaughter among eligible offenses, did not intend that result.<\/p>\n

The trial court must consider the defendant’s specific circumstances\u2014criminal history (or lack thereof), background, family situation, community ties, likelihood of rehabilitation, and any aggravating or mitigating circumstances of the offense beyond the bare elements\u2014and tie its analysis to the diversion statute’s purposes. Bobo, with no prior record and substantial supporting evidence of community ties and rehabilitation potential, was entitled to consideration on those factors.<\/p>\n

The court issued a writ directing the appellate division to vacate its order, issue a peremptory writ in the first instance, and direct the superior court to reconsider Bobo’s suitability for diversion in conformity with the opinion.<\/p>\n

Key Takeaways<\/h2>\n