{"id":306,"date":"2026-01-02T12:00:00","date_gmt":"2026-01-02T12:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/california.shuster.info\/?p=306"},"modified":"2026-01-02T12:00:00","modified_gmt":"2026-01-02T12:00:00","slug":"lewis-tesla-reconsideration-arbitration-efaa","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/california.shuster.info\/?p=306","title":{"rendered":"Lewis v. Tesla, Inc. \u2014 N.D. Cal. denies reconsideration of order forcing arbitration of harassment claims"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n
\n
Case<\/dt>\n
Anthony Lewis v. Tesla, Inc.<\/dd>\n
Court<\/dt>\n
U.S. District Court \u2014 Northern District of California<\/dd>\n
Date Decided<\/dt>\n
2026-01-02<\/dd>\n
Docket No.<\/dt>\n
3:24-cv-08178<\/dd>\n
Status<\/dt>\n
Unreported \/ Non-Citable<\/dd>\n
Topics<\/dt>\n
Arbitration; Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act; Rule 59(e); reconsideration<\/dd>\n<\/dl>\n<\/div>\n

Background<\/h2>\n

Anthony Lewis sued Tesla, Inc. in the Northern District of California asserting workplace harassment claims. Tesla moved to compel arbitration based on the parties\u2019 written agreement. Lewis argued that the federal Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act (\u201cEFAA\u201d), passed in 2022, blocked enforcement of the arbitration clause as to his sexual-harassment allegations. The EFAA gives an employee the right to refuse arbitration of a sexual-assault or sexual-harassment dispute, but only when the dispute \u201carose or accrued\u201d on or after the law\u2019s effective date.<\/p>\n

In a September 2025 order, Judge Araceli Mart\u00ednez-Olgu\u00edn granted Tesla\u2019s motion. She found Lewis had not carried his burden to show the EFAA applied: he had not put into the record the date he filed his administrative complaint with the California Civil Rights Department (\u201cCCRD\u201d). Under California\u2019s framework as construed in Kader v. Southern California Medical Center, Inc.<\/em>, the dispute is treated as having arisen no later than that filing date. Without that fact, Lewis could not show the dispute accrued after the EFAA took effect. The court also rejected his argument that the arbitration clause was unconscionable.<\/p>\n

Lewis then filed a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment, or alternatively for leave to seek reconsideration under Civil Local Rule 7-9. He attached a March 28, 2024 CCRD right-to-sue notice as supposed \u201cnewly discovered evidence,\u201d argued the prior order rested on clear error and would cause manifest injustice, and pointed to recent Sixth and Third Circuit decisions interpreting the EFAA. Tesla opposed, contending the document had been in counsel\u2019s possession all along and that the cited circuit cases did not change governing law.<\/p>\n

The Court’s Holding<\/h2>\n

The court denied Lewis\u2019s motion in full. It applied the demanding Ninth Circuit standard for Rule 59(e) relief: such motions are an \u201cextraordinary remedy\u201d available only on newly discovered evidence, clear error or manifest injustice, intervening change in controlling law, or other highly unusual circumstances, and they cannot be used to relitigate prior arguments or present material that could have been raised earlier.<\/p>\n

The right-to-sue notice was not newly discovered. Lewis conceded it had been in his counsel\u2019s file before the arbitration ruling, and its relevance was foreseeable because his complaint expressly referenced exhaustion before the CCRD and the court had ordered supplemental briefing on the EFAA burden. He had failed to show the diligence required by Civil Local Rule 7-9(b)(1), and his motion repeated arguments already made, in violation of Local Rule 7-9(c).<\/p>\n

The court also rejected the claim of clear error, reaffirming that under Kader<\/em> the dispute arose no later than the CCRD filing date and that Lewis\u2019s failure to put that date in the record was his own evidentiary failing, not a misreading of California law. Finally, the recent out-of-circuit decisions \u2014 the Sixth Circuit\u2019s Memmer v. United Wholesale Mortgage<\/em> and the Third Circuit\u2019s Cornelius v. CVS Pharmacy<\/em> \u2014 are not binding in the Ninth Circuit and, in any event, reinforce that EFAA applicability is a fact-specific inquiry that depends on when the dispute arose. New arguments raised for the first time in Lewis\u2019s reply, including a pivot to Rule 54(b), were waived. The arbitration stay therefore remains in place, with periodic status reports due to the court.<\/p>\n

Key Takeaways<\/h2>\n