{"id":312,"date":"2026-01-04T12:00:00","date_gmt":"2026-01-04T12:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/california.shuster.info\/?p=312"},"modified":"2026-01-04T12:00:00","modified_gmt":"2026-01-04T12:00:00","slug":"jose-bm-murray-ed-cal-rejects-entry-fiction-defense-orders-release-paroled-noncitizen","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/california.shuster.info\/?p=312","title":{"rendered":"Jose B.M. v. Murray \u2014 E.D. Cal. Rejects ‘Entry Fiction’ Defense, Orders Release of Paroled Noncitizen Re-Detained at Check-In"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Case<\/dt>\n
Jose B.M. v. Murray<\/dd>\n
Court<\/dt>\n
U.S. District Court \u2014 Eastern District of California<\/dd>\n
Date Decided<\/dt>\n
2026-01-04<\/dd>\n
Docket No.<\/dt>\n
1:25-cv-01584-KES-CDB<\/dd>\n
Status<\/dt>\n
Unreported \/ Non-Citable<\/dd>\n
Topics<\/dt>\n
Immigration habeas corpus, entry fiction doctrine, humanitarian parole, due process, Barrera-Echavarria<\/dd>\n<\/dl>\n<\/div>\n

Background<\/h2>\n

The petitioner, identified as Jose B.M., is a 30-year-old asylum-seeker from Colombia who entered the United States without inspection in October 2024. After an asylum officer found he had a credible fear of torture if returned, immigration officials placed him in removal proceedings and, in November 2024, released him on humanitarian parole and into the federal Alternatives to Detention program. The petitioner reported for check-ins, including at offices in San Bernardino, Los Angeles, and Blossom Hill, and maintained a clean criminal record.<\/p>\n

The government later asserted that he had missed several virtual check-ins on a phone application and several in-person home visits. ICE called him in for a check-in on October 27, 2025; when he appeared as instructed, ICE arrested him and detained him at the Mesa Verde ICE Processing Center. He filed a habeas corpus petition (a court action challenging the legality of detention) and asked for a temporary restraining order ordering immediate release. The court converted the request into a motion for a preliminary injunction.<\/p>\n

The government’s central argument was distinctive: it invoked the so-called ‘entry fiction’ \u2014 a long-standing immigration doctrine that treats certain noncitizens technically inside the United States as if they were still ‘on the threshold’ of entry \u2014 and the Ninth Circuit’s 1995 en banc decision in Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, which held that excludable Cuban nationals had no substantive due process right to be free from immigration detention.<\/p>\n

The Court’s Holding<\/h2>\n

The court granted the preliminary injunction and ordered the petitioner’s immediate release, rejecting the government’s entry-fiction argument. The court explained that Barrera-Echavarria interpreted a former immigration statute (8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1226(e)) that has since been repealed, and that subsequent amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act eliminated the term ‘excludable’ from the law. The court found that, as applied to a paroled asylum-seeker pursuing relief in active removal proceedings, the older entry fiction does not foreclose a due process claim for release without a bond hearing.<\/p>\n

On the constitutional analysis, the court applied the familiar two-step inquiry. First, it found the petitioner had a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause because his humanitarian parole \u2014 like the parole at issue in Morrissey v. Brewer \u2014 allowed him to live in the community and form normal attachments. Second, applying the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, the court concluded that the petitioner was entitled to a bond hearing where the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is a flight risk or danger to the community.<\/p>\n

The court addressed the government’s claim that alleged release violations justified detention, noting that even where some violation may have occurred, that does not eliminate the obligation to provide due process before depriving the petitioner of liberty. The court was unpersuaded by the government’s offer that an upcoming removal hearing would suffice, noting that the upcoming hearing was on the merits of removal \u2014 not a bond hearing \u2014 and that, under a recent Board of Immigration Appeals decision (Matter of Yajure Hurtado), the immigration court would in any event treat the petitioner as ineligible for release on bond.<\/p>\n

Key Takeaways<\/h2>\n