{"id":376,"date":"2026-01-05T12:00:00","date_gmt":"2026-01-05T12:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/california.shuster.info\/?p=376"},"modified":"2026-01-05T12:00:00","modified_gmt":"2026-01-05T12:00:00","slug":"mcgee-enfante-sealing-rule-60-vexatious-litigant-juvenile-records","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/california.shuster.info\/?p=376","title":{"rendered":"McGee v. Enfante \u2014 N.D. Cal. denies sealing, default, and Rule 60 relief, refuses vexatious-litigant order without hearing"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Case<\/dt>\n
Anthony McGee v. Christopher Enfante, et al.<\/dd>\n
Court<\/dt>\n
U.S. District Court \u2014 Northern District of California<\/dd>\n
Date Decided<\/dt>\n
2026-01-05<\/dd>\n
Docket No.<\/dt>\n
3:23-cv-00375<\/dd>\n
Status<\/dt>\n
Unreported \/ Non-Citable<\/dd>\n
Topics<\/dt>\n
Sealing; California Welfare and Institutions Code \u00a7 827; Rule 55 default judgment; Rule 60(b)(3), (4), (6); vexatious litigant pre-filing order; De Long v. Hennessey<\/em>; Ringgold-Lockhart v. County of Los Angeles<\/em>; rule of completeness<\/dd>\n<\/dl>\n<\/div>\n

Background<\/h2>\n

Anthony McGee filed a \u00a7 1983 civil rights action against Christopher Enfante and Derrek Dagneau. The case was dismissed on the merits under Rule 41(b), and the Ninth Circuit issued its mandate. Despite the closed posture, McGee then filed a series of post-judgment motions, including a motion to seal \u201call juvenile court records,\u201d a motion for default judgment, and a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment based on (3) fraud, (4) void judgment, and (6) other reasons. Defendants opposed, sought reimbursement of fees, and asked the court to declare McGee a vexatious litigant. Both sides briefed in response to the court\u2019s order for further briefing.<\/p>\n

The Court’s Holding<\/h2>\n

Magistrate Judge Alex G. Tse denied all relief.<\/p>\n

On the motion to seal, the court found nothing left to seal. Defendants\u2019 records had already been sealed by prior orders; McGee\u2019s own records had likewise been sealed; and McGee did not identify specific records or docket numbers requiring further action. McGee\u2019s broader request to seal the entire record violated the narrow-tailoring requirement of Civil Local Rule 79-5(c)(3). His suggestion that the court\u2019s own orders should be sealed was also rejected: the orders cite to redacted versions of sealed documents, and the strong presumption of public access under Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. General Motors Corp.<\/em> applies. The court declined to reach McGee\u2019s argument that the underlying juvenile records should have been destroyed under California statute, noting it was beyond the scope of a sealing motion.<\/p>\n

On the motion for default judgment, the court denied the motion both on procedural grounds (improper notice) and on the merits: defendants had appeared and prevailed on a Rule 41(b) merits dismissal, so Rule 55 was inapplicable.<\/p>\n

On Rule 60(b), the court worked through McGee\u2019s arguments under each subsection. Rule 60(b)(3), (4), and (6) require fraud or misconduct, a void judgment, or other extraordinary justification respectively. The court took judicial notice that McGee had been convicted in United States v. McGee<\/em>, with supervised-release revocation requiring sex-offender registration. Defendants\u2019 filing of police reports was proper because McGee had himself filed part of the report and asked the court to take judicial notice of it; under the Federal Rule of Evidence 106 rule of completeness, defendants could introduce the rest. McGee\u2019s argument that the records were juvenile records protected by California Welfare and Institutions Code \u00a7 827 failed both because \u00a7 827.2(c) authorizes disclosure of records pertaining to juveniles found to have committed certain enumerated felonies (including the felony McGee was convicted of) and because the records appeared to be adult criminal records that merely referenced juvenile offenses. McGee\u2019s \u00a7 827(a)(2)(D) service argument also failed because no juvenile-court access order or request was identified.<\/p>\n

On the vexatious-litigant request, the court refused to enter a pre-filing order. The Ninth Circuit\u2019s framework in De Long v. Hennessey<\/em> and Ringgold-Lockhart v. County of Los Angeles<\/em> requires notice, an opportunity to be heard, an adequate record, substantive findings of frivolousness, and a narrowly tailored order. McGee had not had a hearing on the issue. The court denied defendants\u2019 fee request as unsupported by any cited authority. McGee was admonished that further duplicative filings could lead to termination of his ECF filing privileges.<\/p>\n

Key Takeaways<\/h2>\n