{"id":424,"date":"2026-01-26T12:00:00","date_gmt":"2026-01-26T12:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/california.shuster.info\/?p=424"},"modified":"2026-01-26T12:00:00","modified_gmt":"2026-01-26T12:00:00","slug":"anthony-hubbard-quasi-judicial-immunity-court-clerk-1983","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/california.shuster.info\/?p=424","title":{"rendered":"Anthony v. Hubbard \u2014 S.D. Cal. Dismisses \u00a71983 Suit Against Court of Appeal Clerk on Quasi-Judicial Immunity Grounds"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Case<\/dt>\n
Anthony v. Hubbard<\/dd>\n
Court<\/dt>\n
U.S. District Court \u2014 Southern District of California<\/dd>\n
Date Decided<\/dt>\n
2026-01-26<\/dd>\n
Docket No.<\/dt>\n
3:25-cv-01551<\/dd>\n
Status<\/dt>\n
Unreported \/ Non-Citable<\/dd>\n
Topics<\/dt>\n
Quasi-judicial immunity, court clerks, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, injunctive relief against judicial officers<\/dd>\n<\/dl>\n<\/div>\n

Background<\/h2>\n

Marian Anthony filed a federal \u00a71983 lawsuit against Michael Hubbard, a Senior Deputy Clerk for the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One. He alleged that from January to May 2025, Hubbard “acting under color of state law, engaged in a pattern of illegal[,] abusive, hostile, and obstructive conduct,” including yelling, refusing filings without valid lawful reasons, and issuing orders “as a judicial officer without judicial authority,” all of which prevented Anthony from filing legal documents and pursuing his appeal.<\/p>\n

Anthony sought money damages, including punitive damages, and injunctive relief. He also separately filed a petition for writ of mandamus to compel disclosure of judicial administrative records. Hubbard moved to dismiss on four grounds: quasi-judicial immunity, \u00a71983’s bar on injunctive relief against judicial officers, lack of standing, and the Younger abstention doctrine.<\/p>\n

The Court’s Holding<\/h2>\n

The court granted Hubbard’s motion to dismiss without leave to amend on the first two grounds, making it unnecessary to reach the standing or Younger questions. The petition for mandamus was denied as moot.<\/p>\n

On damages, court clerks are protected by quasi-judicial absolute immunity for tasks that are “an integral part of the judicial process,” under Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Court<\/em> and the Ninth Circuit’s later decisions extending quasi-judicial immunity even to administrative-seeming acts that, viewed in context, are part of the judicial function. Refusing filings, processing documents submitted to the clerk, and similar court-clerk conduct fall squarely within this protection. Even allegations of yelling, hostility, and “orders without judicial authority” did not strip immunity because the underlying acts (filing acceptance and processing) are integral to the judicial process.<\/p>\n

On injunctive relief, the court applied the 1996 amendment to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, which provides that injunctive relief shall not be granted against a judicial officer for acts taken in a judicial capacity “unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” Plaintiff did not allege either condition. The court rejected his attempt to add a declaratory-relief claim only in his opposition brief, both because it was not in the complaint and because declaratory relief is unavailable for already-completed alleged constitutional injuries under Sterner v. San Diego Police Department<\/em>.<\/p>\n

The court denied leave to amend, applying the rule that leave is denied when no consistent additional facts could cure the deficiency.<\/p>\n

Key Takeaways<\/h2>\n