{"id":513,"date":"2026-05-04T12:00:00","date_gmt":"2026-05-04T12:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/california.shuster.info\/?p=513"},"modified":"2026-05-05T01:58:01","modified_gmt":"2026-05-05T01:58:01","slug":"people-v-moss-1172-75-resentencing-upper-term","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/california.shuster.info\/?p=513","title":{"rendered":"People v. Moss \u2014 2nd District Says Section 1172.75 Resentencing Court Can Reimpose Upper Term Without New Jury Findings on Aggravating Facts"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n
\n
Case<\/dt>\n
People v. Moss<\/dd>\n
Court<\/dt>\n
2nd District Court of Appeal<\/dd>\n
Date Decided<\/dt>\n
2026-05-04<\/dd>\n
Docket No.<\/dt>\n
B343073<\/dd>\n
Status<\/dt>\n
Reported \/ Citable<\/dd>\n
Topics<\/dt>\n
Penal Code section 1172.75, resentencing, upper-term sentencing, Sixth Amendment, aggravating factors, prior prison term enhancement<\/dd>\n<\/dl>\n<\/div>\n

Background<\/h2>\n

Lorenzo Moss pleaded guilty in 2017 to traumatic and willful injury of a romantic partner under Penal Code section 273.5(a) \u2014 a charge that arose from his stabbing his partner 17 times with a pocketknife and punching her in the face while she was hospitalized. The trial court imposed the upper term of five years, doubled it because of a prior strike to ten years, and added five years for a prior serious felony, one year for prior prison term, and one year for use of a deadly weapon \u2014 a total 17-year sentence.<\/p>\n

In 2021, the Legislature passed Senate Bill 483 (codified at Penal Code section 1172.75), which retroactively invalidated one-year prior-prison-term enhancements and required full resentencing of anyone whose sentence included one. Moss qualified. He asked the resentencing court to drop the upper term to a middle term, arguing that under Penal Code section 1170(b)(2) \u2014 also amended in 2021 \u2014 a court can impose an upper term only when the aggravating facts have been admitted by the defendant or found true beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury or judge.<\/p>\n

The resentencing court struck the prior-prison-term enhancement and the deadly-weapon enhancement, but it kept the upper term on the section 273.5 conviction, citing the nature of the case and Moss’s stipulated prior conviction. It imposed a 15-year sentence. Moss appealed, arguing the upper term violated his Sixth Amendment right to jury findings on aggravating factors.<\/p>\n

The Court’s Holding<\/h2>\n

The Second District affirmed. The court agreed that section 1170(b)(2)’s 2021 amendments require any aggravating facts supporting an upper term to be either stipulated to or proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury or judge. But the court held that Moss had already stipulated to the operative aggravating facts \u2014 most importantly, the prior conviction the court relied on \u2014 when he entered his original plea. Reimposing the upper term on resentencing using facts already admitted does not require fresh jury findings.<\/p>\n

The court also rejected Moss’s Sixth Amendment argument under Apprendi v. New Jersey<\/em> and Cunningham v. California<\/em>. Those cases require jury findings of fact that increase the maximum punishment beyond what the defendant’s admissions or the jury’s verdict would otherwise support. Where the defendant has already stipulated to the relevant fact (here, the prior conviction), there is no Sixth Amendment problem in a sentencing court relying on it. The resentencing court’s use of Moss’s deadly-weapon conduct (admitted in his plea) to support the upper term, while excluding the duplicative one-year weapon-use enhancement, was also proper.<\/p>\n

Key Takeaways<\/h2>\n