{"id":514,"date":"2026-05-04T12:00:00","date_gmt":"2026-05-04T12:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/california.shuster.info\/?p=514"},"modified":"2026-05-05T01:58:01","modified_gmt":"2026-05-05T01:58:01","slug":"people-v-pineda-1172-6-perkins-declaration-against-interest","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/california.shuster.info\/?p=514","title":{"rendered":"People v. Pineda \u2014 2nd District Holds Codefendant’s Perkins-Operation Statements Are Admissible at 1172.6 Hearing as Declarations Against Penal Interest"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n
\n
Case<\/dt>\n
People v. Pineda<\/dd>\n
Court<\/dt>\n
2nd District Court of Appeal<\/dd>\n
Date Decided<\/dt>\n
2026-05-04<\/dd>\n
Docket No.<\/dt>\n
B343654<\/dd>\n
Status<\/dt>\n
Reported \/ Citable<\/dd>\n
Topics<\/dt>\n
Penal Code section 1172.6, evidentiary hearing, hearsay, declaration against penal interest, Perkins operation, gang shooting<\/dd>\n<\/dl>\n<\/div>\n

Background<\/h2>\n

Alvin Pineda pleaded no contest in 2014 to voluntary manslaughter and two counts of willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder for his role in a gang shooting at a baptismal party. The shooting killed one person and injured several others. Pineda later petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, the procedure created by Senate Bill 1437 to let people convicted under broader theories of murder liability seek to have their convictions vacated.<\/p>\n

Section 1172.6’s evidentiary hearing rules are unusual. The Evidence Code generally governs, but the statute lets the court consider evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is admissible under current law. Critically, the statute excludes hearsay admitted at the preliminary hearing under Penal Code section 872(b) (which permits law-enforcement officer testimony relaying out-of-court statements) \u2014 unless the hearsay falls within an independent exception.<\/p>\n

At Pineda’s resentencing hearing, the only evidence was an officer’s preliminary-hearing testimony relaying statements made by Pineda’s codefendant Gilberto Salinas. Police had placed Salinas in a cell with a confidential informant, taped their conversation (a so-called Perkins<\/em> operation, named for Illinois v. Perkins<\/em>), and Salinas identified Pineda as the shooter. Salinas described how Pineda \u2014 known by the moniker "True" \u2014 arrived with a gun, the gun fell to the floor during a fight with rival gang members, Pineda picked it up and started shooting. Without that testimony, the prosecution could not place Pineda as the shooter.<\/p>\n

The Court’s Holding<\/h2>\n

The Second District affirmed the denial of resentencing. The pivotal evidentiary question was whether Salinas’s Perkins<\/em>-operation statements qualified as declarations against penal interest \u2014 an exception to the hearsay rule under Evidence Code section 1230. The trial court had admitted them on that theory, and the Court of Appeal agreed.<\/p>\n

Salinas’s statements were classic declarations against penal interest. He admitted being a Hangout Boys gang member, recognized rival Playboys gang members at the party, instigated the confrontation, called for backup with a gun, and personally pulled the gun in the middle of a fight before Pineda took it and fired. Each of those admissions exposed Salinas to homicide and gang-related criminal liability. Even though some of the statements technically minimized his own culpability while shifting the killing to Pineda, the overall narrative was so self-incriminating that it qualified under section 1230.<\/p>\n

With Salinas’s statements properly admitted, substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Pineda could still be convicted under current law as the actual shooter \u2014 making him ineligible for section 1172.6 relief. The court applied the deferential substantial-evidence standard from People v. Schell<\/em> (2022).<\/p>\n

Key Takeaways<\/h2>\n