{"id":516,"date":"2026-05-04T12:00:00","date_gmt":"2026-05-04T12:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/california.shuster.info\/?p=516"},"modified":"2026-05-05T01:58:01","modified_gmt":"2026-05-05T01:58:01","slug":"doerr-v-shinn-rhines-stay-abey-atkins-amended","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/california.shuster.info\/?p=516","title":{"rendered":"Doerr v. Shinn \u2014 Ninth Circuit Amends Rhines Stay-and-Abey Order, Sends Atkins Intellectual-Disability Claim Back to District Court"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n
\n
Case<\/dt>\n
Doerr v. Shinn<\/dd>\n
Court<\/dt>\n
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals<\/dd>\n
Date Decided<\/dt>\n
2026-05-04<\/dd>\n
Docket No.<\/dt>\n
20-99002<\/dd>\n
Status<\/dt>\n
Reported \/ Citable<\/dd>\n
Topics<\/dt>\n
federal habeas, Rhines stay and abey, ineffective assistance of counsel, Atkins claim, AEDPA, capital case, exhaustion<\/dd>\n<\/dl>\n<\/div>\n

Background<\/h2>\n

Eugene Allen Doerr, an Arizona death-row prisoner, has been litigating his federal habeas petition since 2002. The petition challenges both his conviction and his death sentence. Doerr seeks to add a claim that his trial counsel was ineffective at the sentencing phase \u2014 failing to investigate or present substantial mitigating evidence \u2014 but he never raised that claim in his first state post-conviction relief (PCR) petition.<\/p>\n

To exhaust the IAC claim now, Doerr would need to file a second Arizona PCR petition. But Arizona’s Rule 32.2(a)(3) generally precludes second PCR petitions, and the federal one-year AEDPA statute of limitations could expire while he tries. The U.S. Supreme Court in Rhines v. Weber<\/em> (2005) authorized federal courts to stay and abey a federal habeas petition while the petitioner returns to state court to exhaust unraised claims, provided the petitioner shows: (1) good cause for the failure to exhaust, (2) the claim is potentially meritorious, and (3) no intentional delay.<\/p>\n

The Ninth Circuit panel \u2014 Judges W. Fletcher, Forrest, and Thomas \u2014 initially issued an opinion in January 2025 granting a Rhines stay for both Doerr’s IAC-at-sentencing claim and his Atkins v. Virginia<\/em> (2002) claim that he is constitutionally ineligible for execution because of intellectual disability. Before the mandate issued, the Arizona Supreme Court decided State v. Traverso<\/em> (2025), which addressed how Rule 32.2(a)(3) handles IAC claims in second PCR petitions. The Ninth Circuit then amended its opinion to take Traverso<\/em> into account.<\/p>\n

The Court’s Holding<\/h2>\n

In the amended opinion, the panel reaffirmed that all three Rhines criteria were satisfied for Doerr’s IAC-at-sentencing claim. Critically, the panel held it could not be sure how Arizona courts would treat the second PCR petition under Traverso<\/em>, State v. Diaz<\/em> (2014), and State v. Anderson<\/em> (2024) \u2014 three decisions that, taken together, leave open the possibility that an Arizona court might hear an IAC claim raised for the first time in a second PCR if the case presents "compelling and unusual circumstances." This is a capital case in which trial counsel and first-PCR counsel both performed abysmally, and an enormous amount of mitigating evidence has never been presented to the Arizona courts. Principles of comity and federalism, the panel reasoned, counsel against a federal court substituting its own procedural-bar judgment for that of the state courts.<\/p>\n

The panel found Doerr satisfied each Rhines element: (1) good cause \u2014 his failure to present the claim was due to first-PCR counsel’s ignorance or inadvertence; (2) potential merit \u2014 the IAC-at-sentencing claim, given the volume of unpresented mitigation, is at least colorable; (3) no dilatory tactics \u2014 Doerr has been pursuing his rights diligently.<\/p>\n

On the Atkins<\/em> claim \u2014 Doerr’s argument that intellectual disability bars his execution under the Eighth Amendment \u2014 the panel changed course from its original opinion. Rather than granting the Rhines stay for that claim itself, the panel held that the district court should address the question in the first instance on remand. Judge Forrest dissented from the court’s analysis on the IAC stay.<\/p>\n

Key Takeaways<\/h2>\n