Primary practice area
Third District affirms dismissal of malpractice and elder-abuse claims against a pain-management doctor added years after the patient’s overdose death, holding the negligence claims were time-barred and the complaint did not allege elder-abuse-level conduct.
Fourth District holds that a successful petitioner in a financial-elder-abuse trust dispute may recover attorney fees under Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.5(a), even though he also defended against the wrongdoers’ competing cross-claim for elder abuse.
Fourth District affirms a trial court order authorizing electroconvulsive therapy for an incarcerated patient with treatment-resistant schizoaffective disorder, holding that ‘no less onerous alternatives’ under Penal Code section 2679(b) refers to medical alternatives, not surrogate-consent procedures.
Fourth District grants writ relief, holding that a Riverside County trial court abused its ‘residual’ discretion under Penal Code section 1001.36 by denying mental-health diversion without proper analysis of the statute’s eligibility and suitability criteria.
Fourth District affirms denial of a Song-Beverly plaintiff’s attorney-fee motion as untimely, holding the motion had to be served within 180 days of the court-ordered dismissal date even though the parties had not formally filed a dismissal.
Second District holds California exemption law applies to collection actions in California courts regardless of where the judgment debtor lives, and that funds rolled over from a surrendered life insurance policy into IRAs are not categorically exempt from levy.
First District reverses an attempted-lewd-act conviction, holding the trial court violated Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7(d)(1) by failing to explain its reasons for overruling defense counsel’s objection to the prosecutor’s peremptory strike of a prospective juror.
Second District reverses an order staying a Song-Beverly action against Thor Motor Coach, holding the warranty’s Indiana forum-selection clause is unenforceable even when accompanied by a stipulation that California law would govern.
Sixth District reverses a Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board reconsideration order, holding the Board exceeded its jurisdiction by granting reconsideration after the former section 5909 60-day deadline ran and that the narrow grounds for equitable tolling were not satisfied.
Second District holds that a juvenile court ordering monitored visitation by a paid professional must first consider the parent’s ability to pay and the availability of reasonable alternatives, where the parent has timely raised an inability-to-pay objection.