Reported / Citable
Background
In 1987, two armed men forced their way into an Orange County condominium, robbed and raped the residents, and shot the male resident to death before fleeing in his car. The case sat unsolved for decades until DNA testing tied Richard Morris to the assault. He was tried and convicted in 2013 of first-degree murder with special circumstances for rape, robbery, and murder for financial gain — and sentenced to life without parole. The jury was instructed under California’s felony-murder rule, which then allowed a conviction for murder if a death occurred during commission of an inherently dangerous felony, even without proof the defendant intended to kill. The record never established whether Morris or his codefendant actually fired the fatal shot.
In 2018, the Legislature passed Senate Bill 1437 to narrow the felony-murder rule. As amended, Penal Code section 189(e) limits felony murder to three categories of defendants: the actual killer; a non-killer who, with intent to kill, "aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree"; and a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life. SB 1437 also created Penal Code section 1172.6, a procedure that lets people convicted under the old, broader rule petition to vacate their murder convictions and be resentenced.
Morris filed a section 1172.6 petition. The trial court denied it at the prima facie stage, reasoning that because the jury had found Morris acted with intent to kill, he was statutorily ineligible for relief. A divided Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed on a different rationale: that aiding the underlying felony alongside the killer was enough to satisfy section 189(e)(2). California’s Courts of Appeal had split on this issue, and the Supreme Court took up the case to resolve the conflict.
The Court’s Holding
The Supreme Court reversed. Justice Groban, writing for a five-justice majority, interpreted section 189(e)(2)’s phrase "in the commission of murder in the first degree" to mean what it says — the non-killer must have aided the actual killer in the lethal act itself, not merely in the predicate felony. The Court relied on the natural meaning of the statutory language, the Legislature’s stated intent in SB 1437 to "more equitably sentence offenders in accordance with their involvement in homicides," and the broader structure of section 189(e), which separately addresses participation in the underlying felony in subdivision (e)(3) (the major-participant-with-reckless-indifference theory). To collapse the two theories — making intent-to-kill plus participation in the felony enough — would render that structural distinction meaningless.
The Court rejected the Attorney General’s argument that requiring participation in the lethal act creates an actus reus higher than what’s needed for ordinary aiding-and-abetting murder. The People still need only prove the non-killer did some act that aided, encouraged, or assisted the actual killer’s homicidal conduct — for example, restraining the victim while the killer fired, blocking an escape route, or supplying the weapon for the killing itself. What’s no longer enough, after SB 1437, is proof only that the defendant participated in the robbery, burglary, or rape during which a co-perpetrator killed someone.
Because the jury instructions in Morris’s 2013 trial did not require the People to prove he aided his codefendant in the lethal act — only that he aided the underlying felonies — Morris was not categorically ineligible for section 1172.6 relief at the prima facie stage. The Court reversed the Court of Appeal and remanded for reconsideration of his resentencing petition, where the trial court will need to decide whether the People can carry their burden of proving Morris aided the killing itself. Chief Justice Guerrero filed a concurring opinion. Justice Yegan, sitting by assignment, dissented.
Key Takeaways
- Resolves a major Courts of Appeal split on what section 189(e)(2) requires of non-killer aider-abettors in felony-murder cases. Decisions like Lopez (2023) and Taito (2025) — which had held that aiding the underlying felony was enough — are no longer good law.
- The actus reus question is now distinct from the mens rea question. Even when a jury finds the defendant intended to kill, the People still must prove the defendant did some act that aided the actual killer in the killing itself, not just the predicate crime.
- Reopens section 1172.6 petitions for many felony-murder defendants previously denied at the prima facie stage on the rationale that intent-to-kill plus felony-participation made them ineligible. Trial courts will need to revisit those denials.
- The two theories of non-killer felony-murder liability are functionally separate: section 189(e)(2) for intent-to-kill participants who aid the lethal act, and section 189(e)(3) for major participants in the felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.
- Examples of qualifying conduct the Court suggested: restraining the victim while the killer fires, blocking an escape route, supplying the weapon used for the killing itself.
Why It Matters
This is one of the most consequential California Supreme Court criminal-procedure decisions of 2026. Senate Bill 1437 was supposed to narrow the felony-murder rule, but for years some Courts of Appeal had read it narrowly enough that a defendant who joined a robbery during which a co-perpetrator unexpectedly killed someone — and was found by a jury to have shared the intent to kill — would still be categorically barred from resentencing relief. Morris closes that loophole. Defense lawyers handling section 1172.6 petitions for clients in this fact pattern now have a clear holding to cite. Prosecutors will need to either show that the original record establishes participation in the lethal act, or face a full evidentiary hearing.
For non-lawyer readers: the practical impact is that a meaningful number of California prisoners serving life-without-parole or long murder sentences for crimes where they did not personally kill anyone — and where the prosecution did not prove they assisted the killing itself — may now get a renewed chance at having their convictions revisited. How many cases Morris ultimately reopens depends on how often the underlying records establish lethal-act participation; in many felony-murder convictions tried before 2018, that question simply was not litigated.