Reported / Citable
Background
Taiwan Orran Reed was convicted in 2020 of pimping, pandering, human trafficking, and rape, and was sentenced to a lengthy prison term. In 2024, Reed filed a habeas corpus petition under California’s Racial Justice Act of 2020 (RJA), alleging that the prosecutor and law-enforcement witnesses used racially discriminatory language at his trial — specifically by referring to him as a ‘gorilla pimp.’ The trial court found a prima facie showing and issued an order to show cause.
After Reed’s retained counsel withdrew and Reed indicated he could not afford a replacement, the Riverside County Superior Court appointed the Riverside County Public Defender. The Public Defender attempted to decline the appointment. The trial court invoked Government Code section 27706, subdivision (a), which generally requires a public defender to accept appointments unless he can show unavailability, and ordered the Public Defender to represent Reed.
The Public Defender filed a writ petition challenging the order.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal granted the writ. Working carefully through Government Code section 27706, the court held that a different subdivision — section 27706(g) — governs public-defender representation of habeas petitioners like Reed. Section 27706(g) provides public defenders with discretion to accept or decline such appointments, without any obligation to show unavailability.
The court explained that section 27706(a)’s mandatory-acceptance rule applies to public-defender appointments in ‘any other proceeding’ enumerated in subdivision (a). Habeas petitions, particularly those involving post-conviction relief like RJA claims, are addressed by section 27706(g), which uses permissive ‘may’ language. Reading the statute as a whole, the Legislature plainly distinguished between the categories of appointments and reserved discretion to public defenders in the habeas context.
The trial court’s contrary order was therefore incorrect. The court directed the trial court to vacate its order compelling the Public Defender to represent Reed; the trial court must instead appoint alternate counsel.
Key Takeaways
- Government Code section 27706(g) gives public defenders discretion to decline appointments to represent habeas petitioners — including RJA claimants — without an unavailability showing.
- Section 27706(a)’s mandatory-acceptance rule does not extend to habeas appointments; the statute distinguishes between appointment categories.
- When a public defender declines a habeas appointment, the trial court must appoint alternate counsel from another source (e.g., conflict panel, retained counsel).
- The decision recognizes the heavy and specialized nature of RJA habeas litigation and the institutional resource constraints public-defender offices face.
- Trial courts and post-conviction litigants should plan for alternate counsel arrangements when public defenders decline appointments.
Why It Matters
This is a significant decision for California’s emerging Racial Justice Act and post-conviction landscape. Petitioners filing habeas claims under the RJA — which has generated substantial litigation since its 2020 enactment — typically need experienced counsel for evidentiary hearings. The Fourth District’s holding that public defenders may decline these appointments will affect how trial courts plan for representation in these cases.
For public-defender offices, the case is welcome confirmation that they can manage scarce resources and decline cases that would strain their ability to represent the broader caseload. For trial courts, it is a directive to identify alternate appointment mechanisms — conflict panels, contract counsel, or appropriate court-appointed specialists — when public defenders decline. For RJA practitioners, the practical takeaway is that representation availability is uneven across counties and that early planning for appointed counsel is essential.