Reported / Citable
Background
Richard Grandberry, a ‘three-striker,’ was originally sentenced in 2001 to a 66-years-to-life term for first-degree burglary and attempted first-degree burglary, with three prior felony strike convictions, three prior serious felony enhancements, and a one-year prior prison term enhancement. After a 2002 nonpublished appellate decision, his sentence was reduced to 41-years-to-life.
In 2024, CDCR identified Grandberry as eligible for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75 because his sentence included an invalid section 667.5(b) prior-prison-term enhancement. He moved for full resentencing, asking the trial court to (1) strike the one-year prior-prison-term enhancement, (2) exercise its discretion under section 1385 to dismiss the three five-year prior-serious-felony enhancements, and (3) exercise Romero discretion to dismiss two of his prior strike convictions.
The trial court struck the one-year and the three five-year enhancements but declined to dismiss any prior strikes, ultimately resentencing Grandberry to 25-years-to-life. He appealed, arguing that Senate Bill 81’s amendments to section 1385(c) — which add specific mitigating factors and a ‘weighs greatly in favor of dismissal’ presumption — should have applied to his prior strikes.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal affirmed. Following People v. Burke and the established appellate consensus, the court held that Senate Bill 81’s section 1385(c) amendments apply only to ‘enhancements’ and do not extend to prior strike convictions under the Three Strikes Law. Strike priors are not enhancements but rather a separate sentencing scheme; the Legislature’s mitigating-factors framework in section 1385(c)(2) does not reach them.
The court further rejected Grandberry’s argument that the rule of lenity should require an interpretation favorable to him. The rule of lenity applies only when a statute is genuinely ambiguous after standard interpretive tools have been exhausted, and the appellate authority interpreting section 1385(c) has reached a settled, non-ambiguous conclusion that strike priors are not within its scope.
Because the trial court correctly understood that SB 81 did not require it to apply the section 1385(c)(2) factors to the strike priors, and because the trial court properly exercised its discretion under Romero to decline to strike them, the resentencing decision was affirmed.
Key Takeaways
- Senate Bill 81’s section 1385(c) amendments do not apply to prior strike convictions under the Three Strikes Law; they apply to enhancements only.
- Trial courts conducting section 1172.75 resentencing have full Romero discretion over prior strikes but are not subject to the section 1385(c)(2) mitigating-factor framework when considering whether to dismiss strikes.
- The rule of lenity does not require expanding section 1385(c) to cover strike priors; California appellate courts have settled that question.
- Defendants seeking to dismiss strike priors at resentencing should focus their argument on traditional Romero factors (rehabilitation, age, current offense) rather than relying on SB 81’s mitigating factors.
- Resentencing courts may strike enhancements while declining to disturb the underlying three-strikes life sentence, particularly where the trial court finds the defendant fits within the spirit of the Three Strikes Law.
Why It Matters
For California criminal defense counsel pursuing resentencing relief on behalf of three-strikers, this opinion is an important confirmation of a now-established interpretive line. Senate Bill 81’s framework — including its ‘weighs greatly in favor of dismissal’ presumption — does not give defense counsel a new avenue to attack strike priors. The Romero analysis remains the operative tool, and trial courts retain wide discretion to leave a three-strikes sentence in place even after striking related enhancements.
For trial courts and prosecutors, the case is a useful citation to support resentencing decisions that strike enhancements while preserving the underlying life term. The opinion also reinforces that the rule of lenity is not a back-door route around settled appellate authority.