Reported / Citable
Background
The Yolo-Solano Air Quality Management District is a regional air pollution control agency. Diamond D General Engineering, Inc. provides agricultural services to farmers and ranchers, and Spencer Defty is Diamond’s chief executive officer. Between 2023 and 2024, the District issued three notices of violation against Diamond for operating equipment without a permit, failing to install emission controls, and failing to minimize smoke in an agricultural burn.
The District’s position rested on an internal policy interpreting an agricultural exemption to exclude independent contractors that provide services to farmers (relying on cases such as Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. McComb and Julius Goldman’s Egg City v. Air Pollution Control District). Diamond and Defty disputed this interpretation and inquired about administrative review. The District confirmed the notices were not appealable through its hearing board.
The District eventually sued Diamond, Defty, and Knotty Wood Barbecue Company for statutory and regulatory violations and for failing to correct conduct after receiving the notices. Diamond and Defty cross-complained for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the District’s underlying interpretive policy had not gone through proper rulemaking and was therefore invalid. The District filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the cross-complaint, which the trial court denied. The District appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed. The court held that the cross-complaint did not arise from the District’s protected activities under the anti-SLAPP statute (Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16) because the cross-complaint challenged the validity of the underlying policy on which the District’s activities were based, not the activities themselves.
For purposes of the anti-SLAPP analysis, a court must focus on the conduct that gives rise to the cause of action. The District’s investigation, issuance of notices of violation, settlement discussions, and filing of the underlying lawsuit are all protected activities under the anti-SLAPP statute. But the cross-complaint did not seek relief based on those specific actions; instead, it challenged the validity of the underlying interpretive policy that the District claimed authorized those actions. A challenge to the validity of an agency policy is not the same as a challenge to the agency’s enforcement actions taken under that policy. The protected activity is at most evidence of how the policy is applied, not the gravamen of the cross-complaint.
Because the cross-complaint did not arise from protected activity, the court did not need to consider whether the cross-complainants had a likelihood of success on the merits. The court also published the opinion in part to clarify that where it is easier to dispose of an anti-SLAPP motion on its merits, courts need not address the public interest exemption to the anti-SLAPP statute.
Key Takeaways
- An anti-SLAPP motion fails when the challenged claims arise from the validity of an underlying agency policy or rule, not from the agency’s specific enforcement actions taken under that policy.
- For anti-SLAPP analysis, courts focus on the conduct giving rise to the cause of action; protected activities that merely provide context or evidence of how a policy is applied do not transform a cause of action into one arising from protected activity.
- Challenges to agency policies based on lack of proper rulemaking are not arising from protected activities, even where the policies have been applied through enforcement actions that involve protected activities.
- Courts may dispose of anti-SLAPP motions on the protected activity prong without addressing the public interest exemption when doing so is the easier path to resolution.
- Air quality management districts and other regulatory agencies may be subject to declaratory relief actions challenging the validity of their interpretive policies, separate from challenges to specific enforcement actions.
Why It Matters
This decision is important for both anti-SLAPP practice and California regulatory law. The opinion reinforces that the anti-SLAPP statute is not a shield against challenges to the validity of underlying agency policies, even when those policies have been applied through enforcement activities that would otherwise be protected.
For regulatory agencies, the case is a reminder that interpretive policies should be promulgated through proper rulemaking procedures to avoid validity challenges. Agencies cannot rely on the anti-SLAPP statute to insulate informal policies from judicial review. For regulated parties facing agency enforcement actions, the opinion confirms that cross-complaints challenging the validity of underlying agency policies are viable and not subject to anti-SLAPP dismissal. For anti-SLAPP practitioners generally, the case provides useful guidance on the protected activity analysis and the relationship between underlying policies and specific enforcement actions.