Reported / Citable
Background
In February 2021, Marvin Joseph Chang attempted to rob a woman at a Three Rivers gas station and fired shots in the area. Two CalFire peace officers spotted his white Prius and engaged their lights and sirens to pull him over. Chang stopped his car, opened the door, and immediately began firing at the officers without warning. He fled and led law enforcement on a high-speed chase exceeding 95 miles per hour, repeatedly firing at pursuing officers, running other vehicles off the road, and ultimately retreating into an orchard where he continued to shoot at officers including a California Highway Patrol officer.
Chang suffered from delusions that CIA agents were trying to harm or kill him and that all peace officers were working on behalf of the CIA. After his arrest and prosecution, the trial court found him competent to stand trial. He requested a jury instruction on imperfect self-defense, which would allow the jury to find that, even if his belief in the necessity of self-defense was unreasonable, it was honestly held and reduced his offenses below murder or attempted murder.
The trial court denied the instruction, citing People v. Elmore. Elmore held that imperfect self-defense is not available when the defendant’s belief in the need for self-defense rests entirely on a delusion without an “objective correlate” in the actual circumstances. The jury convicted Chang of multiple counts including attempted murder of peace officers. He appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed. The court explained that imperfect self-defense is a species of mistake of fact, in which a defendant may hold an actual but unreasonable belief that self-defense is necessary. A pure delusion is different: it is the perception of facts not grounded in reality at all. To trigger an imperfect self-defense instruction in a case involving mental illness, there must be an objective correlate in the actual circumstances that the defendant perceived in a mistaken way, not just a free-standing delusion that is generated entirely within the defendant’s mind.
Applying that framework, the court held that the mere presence of a peace officer attempting to make a routine traffic stop is not an objective correlate that supports an imperfect self-defense theory. The officers in Chang’s case had not brandished weapons or issued threats before he opened fire. They were responding to a report of shots fired and were operating in a marked CalFire truck while in peace officer uniforms. Nothing in their conduct objectively suggested any threat of unlawful harm.
The court contrasted this scenario with situations where there might be an objective correlate. For example, if an officer (or anyone else) were holding a small dark object pointed at the defendant, a jury could find an honest but unreasonable belief that the object was a gun, supporting an imperfect self-defense theory. But the mere fact of being approached or pursued by a peace officer is not enough. To hold otherwise would essentially permit a delusion-based defense whenever an officer encountered a defendant with paranoid beliefs, undermining the doctrinal limits set out in Elmore.
Key Takeaways
- Imperfect self-defense requires an actual but unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense; a pure delusion without any objective correlate is not enough.
- The mere presence of a peace officer attempting to make a stop is not, by itself, an objective correlate that supports an imperfect self-defense instruction.
- Officers brandishing weapons or making threats might supply an objective correlate, but routine policing activity does not.
- Defendants suffering from delusions may still be convicted of attempted murder of peace officers when the only basis for their belief in self-defense is the delusion itself.
- Imperfect self-defense remains a species of mistake of fact, not a doctrine for accommodating mental illness independent of the actual circumstances.
Why It Matters
This decision is an important application of the imperfect self-defense doctrine in cases involving mental illness. It clarifies that a defendant cannot transform routine police-citizen encounters into objective correlates simply by alleging delusions. The opinion preserves the careful balance set out in Elmore between recognizing genuine mistakes of fact and refusing to convert imperfect self-defense into a backdoor diminished capacity defense.
For criminal defense lawyers representing clients with documented delusions, the case is a reminder that imperfect self-defense is unlikely to succeed unless the record shows specific objective conduct by the alleged victim that could support a mistaken-but-honest self-defense belief. Mental health evidence may be relevant to other defenses, including pleas of not guilty by reason of insanity, but it cannot substitute for an objective correlate when seeking the imperfect self-defense instruction.