Reported / Citable
Background
The Gerard Trust filed an unlawful-detainer action against Janet Cuevas alleging failure to pay rent on a Covina single-family residence. Cuevas’s first-amended answer asserted multiple defenses, including breach of warranty of habitability, defective notice, and rent-stabilization-ordinance violations, and demanded a jury trial.
On October 18, 2024 — three days before trial — plaintiff filed a section 1987 ‘Notice to Attend Trial’ demanding Cuevas appear personally as a witness on October 22, with no order shortening time. The matter was called for trial on October 21; both sides announced ready, and a panel of jurors was ordered. The next afternoon, voir dire began. The trial court took plaintiff’s oral motion to strike Cuevas’s answer under submission. On October 23, when Cuevas (who was at her place of employment with 91 minutes’ notice) did not appear, the trial court granted plaintiff’s motion to strike Cuevas’s answer and entered a default judgment for plaintiff.
The Court’s Holding
The Appellate Division reversed. Code of Civil Procedure section 1987 requires 10 days’ notice for a notice to attend trial absent a court order shortening time. Plaintiff’s notice was served three days before trial without any order shortening time, and the trial court’s retroactive ‘order’ effectively reducing the notice to 91 minutes was an abuse of discretion. Section 1987 protects the noticed party’s ability to plan and arrange to attend, and 91 minutes’ notice — to a person who was at work — does not satisfy the statute’s purpose.
Even if the notice had been valid, the imposition of a terminating sanction (striking the answer and entering default judgment) was disproportionate. Lesser sanctions or a brief continuance to allow Cuevas to attend would have addressed any prejudice. Striking an answer and entering default for an unlawful-detainer trial is among the most drastic sanctions available, and is reserved for serious or repeated violations of court orders.
The court reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings.
Key Takeaways
- A Code of Civil Procedure section 1987 notice to attend trial requires 10 days’ notice unless the court has issued an order shortening time before service.
- Trial courts cannot retroactively shorten section 1987’s notice period to a few hours and then sanction the noticed party for not appearing.
- Terminating sanctions (striking answers and entering default) are reserved for serious or repeated violations and are disproportionate responses to single notice-compliance failures.
- Tenants in unlawful-detainer cases retain procedural protections; trial courts cannot bypass them through aggressive use of section 1987.
- Counsel for plaintiffs who want a defendant present at trial should plan ahead and serve a section 1987 notice with adequate lead time.
Why It Matters
For California unlawful-detainer practice, this Appellate Division decision is a significant procedural protection for tenants. With unlawful-detainer trials proceeding on highly compressed timelines, the temptation for landlord counsel to use last-minute notices to compel tenant appearance — and for trial courts to grant default after non-appearance — is real. The Los Angeles Appellate Division has now made clear that section 1987’s 10-day notice requirement is a meaningful protection that cannot be retroactively waived.
For landlord counsel, the practical lesson is to plan trial logistics earlier and to serve section 1987 notices with at least 10 days’ lead time, or to obtain orders shortening time before service. For tenants and tenant-rights advocates, the case is a useful tool to attack default judgments entered after similar last-minute notices. For trial courts, the opinion is a cautionary note about the proportionality of terminating sanctions, especially in unlawful-detainer cases where loss of housing is the immediate consequence.