Reported / Citable
Background
In 1999, 16-year-old Monica Diaz exchanged letters with her boyfriend Michael Naranjo expressing admiration for murderers and a desire to commit murder themselves. On July 21, 2000, Diaz let Naranjo into her home, where she lived with her aunt, uncle, and four cousins. Diaz waited in the bathroom while Naranjo stabbed five family members; the uncle and three cousins died. Diaz’s fingerprints or palm print were on butterfly and throwing knives at the scene and on a roll of duct tape that was to be used to bind or gag the victims.
A jury convicted Diaz of four counts of first-degree murder; she was sentenced to four consecutive 25-years-to-life terms. In 2020, Diaz petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 (formerly section 1170.95). After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found Diaz could be convicted today as a direct aider and abettor with intent to kill (express malice) and as a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.
Diaz appealed, arguing the trial court failed to consider her youth in determining whether she possessed the requisite mental state, and that her counsel was ineffective.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal affirmed. Section 1172.6 retroactively applied changes to California murder law to defendants convicted under now-invalid theories (such as the natural-and-probable-consequences doctrine). It does not, however, provide relief to defendants who can still be convicted under post-2019 law. A direct aider and abettor of murder who acted with the intent to kill is guilty of murder under current law and cannot obtain section 1172.6 relief.
The trial court’s finding that Diaz acted with express malice — intent to kill — was supported by substantial evidence. Diaz’s letters, her active facilitation of Naranjo’s entry, her physical preparation of weapons and restraints, and her presence in the home throughout the attack all supported the inference that she shared Naranjo’s intent to kill. Because that finding stands, Diaz is not entitled to section 1172.6 relief regardless of any reckless-indifference issues with the alternative felony-murder theory.
The court declined to reach Diaz’s argument that the trial court should have considered her youth in evaluating mental state because the express-malice finding was independently dispositive. It also rejected the ineffective-assistance claim.
Key Takeaways
- Section 1172.6 resentencing is unavailable to defendants who can still be convicted of murder under current law; direct aiders and abettors with intent to kill remain liable.
- Substantial evidence of intent to kill — including pre-offense letters, weapons preparation, and active facilitation of the killing — supports a finding of express malice.
- When direct-aider-with-express-malice liability is found, alternative theories (felony-murder reckless indifference) need not be analyzed; the express-malice finding is dispositive.
- Youth considerations under Senate Bill 1437 and related statutes affect mental-state findings, but a robust record of intent-to-kill conduct may render those considerations moot.
- Petitioners must engage with the elements of current murder law as actually pleaded and as supported by the record of conviction.
Why It Matters
The decision is part of California’s continuing development of post-Senate Bill 1437 murder-resentencing law. With many petitioners filing under section 1172.6, the appellate courts have produced a steady stream of opinions clarifying when relief is available. The Second District’s published opinion makes clear that direct-aider-with-intent-to-kill liability survives — so the focus of trial-court resentencing inquiries should be on whether the petitioner can still be convicted under that theory.
For criminal defense counsel pursuing section 1172.6 petitions, the lesson is to evaluate the record of conviction carefully and to avoid premising a petition on theories that current law plainly allows. For prosecutors, the case provides strong authority for opposing petitions in cases where the trial record clearly establishes shared intent to kill. Youth-related arguments may still play a role in some 1172.6 cases — but where the record establishes express malice on its face, those arguments may not move the needle.