Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Francisco Baez-Diaz was caught in June 2023 jumping off a jet ski near Imperial Beach. Border Patrol officers found him hiding in a vehicle in a wet suit, and he admitted he was a Mexican citizen who had previously been deported four times. He was charged with attempted reentry of a removed alien. His lawyer, Mara Gonzalez Souto, presented an “acquired citizenship” defense at trial — a legal theory based on his grandfather’s birth certificate and historical railroad employment records. The jury rejected the defense and convicted him. The court sentenced him to 48 months in prison.
Before trial, the government offered Baez-Diaz a “fast-track” plea deal, a commonly used early-resolution program in border districts. Gonzalez Souto told him the government’s recommendation under the deal would be roughly 18 to 24 months, that he would likely receive 18 months at the low end, and that if he went to trial his guideline range would be 27 to 41 months depending on whether he received credit for accepting responsibility. After he was convicted, however, the actual guideline range turned out to be much higher — 51 to 63 months. In other words, the lawyer materially undercalculated his post-trial guideline exposure.
Baez-Diaz then filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the federal statute that allows a prisoner to attack his conviction or sentence in the same court that imposed it. He argued that the lawyer’s miscalculation was ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. The court held an evidentiary hearing in October 2025, where both Baez-Diaz and his lawyer testified.
The Court’s Holding
The court denied the §2255 motion. It ruled that even if the lawyer’s miscalculation was “deficient performance” under the first part of the Strickland v. Washington standard, the petitioner could not show “prejudice” — the second required element. To prove prejudice on a rejected plea offer, the law (under Lafler v. Cooper and related Supreme Court cases) requires the defendant to show that, with correct advice, there is a reasonable probability he would have accepted the offer, the court would have approved it, and the resulting sentence would have been less severe than the one actually imposed.
The judge made detailed credibility findings after the evidentiary hearing. He believed the lawyer’s testimony that she had advised Baez-Diaz of the risk of a higher sentence at trial, including a possible range up to 41 months. He did not believe Baez-Diaz’s claims that the lawyer promised him a sentence below the fast-track offer or even as low as “12 months and 1 day.” Critically, the petitioner himself testified that he was willing to plead guilty only if the sentence would be less than 30 months — yet he rejected an 18-month offer that fell below that line. Because Baez-Diaz had already rejected a deal that satisfied his stated acceptable sentence, the court found no reasonable probability that better advice would have led him to accept any plea offer. Without that probability, he could not show prejudice and could not win on his Sixth Amendment claim.
The court also denied a certificate of appealability — the procedural permission a §2255 petitioner needs to take his case to the Ninth Circuit — because it concluded no reasonable jurist would debate the prejudice ruling.
Key Takeaways
- Even a clear sentencing-guidelines miscalculation by defense counsel does not automatically result in §2255 relief. The petitioner must still show that better advice would have changed the outcome of the plea process.
- A defendant’s own pre-trial statements about what sentence he would have accepted matter a great deal. If the actual offer was below that line and he still rejected it, claims that he would have accepted with better advice are difficult to credit.
- Strickland prejudice analysis in the rejected-plea context follows Lafler v. Cooper: a defendant must show the offer would have been accepted and approved, and that the resulting sentence would have been less severe than the one actually imposed.
- Credibility findings after a §2255 evidentiary hearing carry substantial weight. A judge who believes counsel’s account of plea negotiations over the petitioner’s account is unlikely to be reversed on appeal.
Why It Matters
The Southern District of California carries one of the heaviest border-prosecution dockets in the country, and §1326 reentry cases like this one make up a significant share of its criminal calendar. Defense lawyers in these cases routinely advise clients on fast-track offers and post-trial guideline exposure, often under tight time pressure. This decision shows that even when defense counsel admits a miscalculation, the petitioner still bears a heavy burden to prove that the mistake actually changed his choice. A defendant who has already turned down an offer below the sentence he says he would have accepted will have a hard time meeting that burden.
For criminal-defense practitioners and §2255 petitioners more generally, the case is a useful illustration of how Strickland’s two-part test plays out in plea-advice cases. Performance and prejudice are independent inquiries, and a court can resolve a motion entirely on the prejudice prong — as this one did, without ever deciding whether the lawyer’s performance fell below an objective standard.