Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Marquis Porter sued General Motors in California state court under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act after his 2019 GMC Sierra 1500 allegedly developed defects covered by GM’s warranties. His complaint identified the make, model, year, VIN, and purchase date of the vehicle but did not allege the purchase price or any specific damages amount. About three months later, after Porter produced his sales agreement and loan payoff letter in discovery on September 2, 2025, GM removed the case to the Northern District of California on September 18, 2025. Porter moved to remand, arguing both that GM removed too late and that GM had not adequately established diversity jurisdiction.
The Court’s Holding
Judge Rita F. Lin denied the motion to remand.
On timeliness, the court joined the substantial majority of district courts in the Ninth Circuit holding that a Song-Beverly complaint that alleges only the vehicle’s make, model, year, VIN, and purchase date does not trigger the first 30-day removal window of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). Under the bright-line rule of Harris v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co. and Kuxhausen v. BMW Financial Services, removability is judged from the four corners of the pleading; a defendant’s subjective knowledge of vehicle market value or its sophistication as an industry player is irrelevant, and a defendant has no duty to investigate. The court also rejected the minority view that a defendant could “guess” the amount in controversy from the make/model alone, noting that a bright-line rule promotes certainty, prevents pleading gamesmanship, and avoids wasteful satellite litigation about borderline cases. The state court’s unlimited-jurisdiction designation (which only requires more than $35,000) likewise did not give GM notice that more than $75,000 was at stake.
The second 30-day window of § 1446(b)(3) was triggered when GM received the sales agreement and loan payoff letter on September 2, 2025, and GM’s September 18, 2025 removal fell within that window. Because neither of the first two windows had elapsed and the one-year outer limit had not run, GM was independently entitled to remove based on its own information under Roth v. CHA Hollywood Medical Center.
On diversity, Porter did not contest GM’s allegations that he was a California citizen (residency in California serving as prima facie evidence of domicile under Mondragon) or that GM is a citizen of Michigan and Delaware (LLC citizenship traced through its members under Johnson v. Columbia Properties Anchorage). Complete diversity was established.
On amount in controversy, the court applied the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard from Dart Cherokee. GM proffered the sale contract, repair history, and loan payoff information showing a $73,753.86 purchase price, supported a calculated estimate of approximately $62,529.65 in actual Song-Beverly damages after mileage and other offsets, and was entitled to include up to double that as a civil penalty under § 1794(c) given Porter’s willful-violation allegation. Following Judge Lin’s prior decision in Johnson v. Volkswagen Group of America, the court held GM did not have to separately prove the willfulness allegation: the amount in controversy includes everything “at stake” regardless of likelihood of recovery. Total — at least $187,588.95 — well exceeded $75,000, without even reaching attorney’s fees.
Key Takeaways
- The majority rule in the Ninth Circuit is now firm: a Song-Beverly complaint that omits the purchase price and any damages amount does not trigger the first 30-day removal clock, even for an obviously expensive vehicle.
- The 30-day clock under § 1446(b)(3) starts when the defendant first receives an “other paper” — typically the sales contract or a loan payoff statement — that lets it determine the amount in controversy.
- Plaintiffs alleging a willful Song-Beverly violation effectively concede that the up-to-double civil penalty is in play for amount-in-controversy purposes; the defendant does not have to prove willfulness as part of removal.
- For LLCs, citizenship traces through every member down to the underlying corporation’s state of incorporation and principal place of business. Plaintiffs who do not contest those allegations forfeit the issue.
- The court’s methodology — purchase price minus mileage offset, third-party contracts, and unpaid financing — is a useful template for valuing Song-Beverly cases at the removal stage.
Why It Matters
The Ninth Circuit’s removal rules have been settled for years, but Song-Beverly suits keep generating litigation around their edges because plaintiffs often plead vaguely in an effort to lock cases into state court. This decision squarely embraces the majority approach and makes the rule plain: vague complaints push the removal clock back to the moment the defendant receives a document showing the amount in controversy.
Combined with the recent Rodrigues v. Jaguar Land Rover ruling and a steady stream of similar Northern District orders, the Porter decision should significantly reduce the volume of borderline remand fights. Plaintiffs’ counsel who want a state-court forum will need to plead a damages cap below $75,000 or attach the sales contract themselves. Defense counsel can wait for the routine production of the sales contract, then remove within thirty days of receipt with confidence that the amount in controversy — actual damages plus the civil penalty for willful violations — will easily clear the threshold.