Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Anthony McGee filed a § 1983 civil rights action against Christopher Enfante and Derrek Dagneau. The case was dismissed on the merits under Rule 41(b), and the Ninth Circuit issued its mandate. Despite the closed posture, McGee then filed a series of post-judgment motions, including a motion to seal “all juvenile court records,” a motion for default judgment, and a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment based on (3) fraud, (4) void judgment, and (6) other reasons. Defendants opposed, sought reimbursement of fees, and asked the court to declare McGee a vexatious litigant. Both sides briefed in response to the court’s order for further briefing.
The Court’s Holding
Magistrate Judge Alex G. Tse denied all relief.
On the motion to seal, the court found nothing left to seal. Defendants’ records had already been sealed by prior orders; McGee’s own records had likewise been sealed; and McGee did not identify specific records or docket numbers requiring further action. McGee’s broader request to seal the entire record violated the narrow-tailoring requirement of Civil Local Rule 79-5(c)(3). His suggestion that the court’s own orders should be sealed was also rejected: the orders cite to redacted versions of sealed documents, and the strong presumption of public access under Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. General Motors Corp. applies. The court declined to reach McGee’s argument that the underlying juvenile records should have been destroyed under California statute, noting it was beyond the scope of a sealing motion.
On the motion for default judgment, the court denied the motion both on procedural grounds (improper notice) and on the merits: defendants had appeared and prevailed on a Rule 41(b) merits dismissal, so Rule 55 was inapplicable.
On Rule 60(b), the court worked through McGee’s arguments under each subsection. Rule 60(b)(3), (4), and (6) require fraud or misconduct, a void judgment, or other extraordinary justification respectively. The court took judicial notice that McGee had been convicted in United States v. McGee, with supervised-release revocation requiring sex-offender registration. Defendants’ filing of police reports was proper because McGee had himself filed part of the report and asked the court to take judicial notice of it; under the Federal Rule of Evidence 106 rule of completeness, defendants could introduce the rest. McGee’s argument that the records were juvenile records protected by California Welfare and Institutions Code § 827 failed both because § 827.2(c) authorizes disclosure of records pertaining to juveniles found to have committed certain enumerated felonies (including the felony McGee was convicted of) and because the records appeared to be adult criminal records that merely referenced juvenile offenses. McGee’s § 827(a)(2)(D) service argument also failed because no juvenile-court access order or request was identified.
On the vexatious-litigant request, the court refused to enter a pre-filing order. The Ninth Circuit’s framework in De Long v. Hennessey and Ringgold-Lockhart v. County of Los Angeles requires notice, an opportunity to be heard, an adequate record, substantive findings of frivolousness, and a narrowly tailored order. McGee had not had a hearing on the issue. The court denied defendants’ fee request as unsupported by any cited authority. McGee was admonished that further duplicative filings could lead to termination of his ECF filing privileges.
Key Takeaways
- Northern District sealing motions must be narrowly tailored under Civil Local Rule 79-5. Sweeping requests to seal “all” records or the entire docket will be denied.
- California Welfare and Institutions Code § 827 protects juvenile-court case files, but § 827.2(c) carves out disclosure of information about juveniles found to have committed enumerated serious felonies under § 707(b). Adult criminal records that merely reference juvenile offenses are not “juvenile case files.”
- Federal Rule of Evidence 106’s rule of completeness lets opposing parties introduce the rest of a document a litigant has selectively put before the court — including police reports.
- Even with a strong vexatious-filing record, courts will not enter a pre-filing order without first providing notice and an opportunity to be heard, satisfying the procedural-due-process requirements of De Long and Ringgold-Lockhart.
- Repeated post-judgment motion practice in a closed case can lead to a warning that ECF filing privileges may be terminated. Counsel and pro se litigants alike should not rely on serial Rule 60 motions to relitigate dismissed cases.
Why It Matters
The opinion combines several recurring issues in Northern District practice: sealing of sensitive criminal-history records, the limits of California juvenile-records confidentiality in federal court, post-judgment motion practice in closed cases, and the procedural prerequisites to a vexatious-litigant order. Each piece is short, but together they form a useful template that magistrate judges and parties can point to when these issues arise in pro se litigation.
The vexatious-litigant analysis is especially worth flagging. Even when faced with what may look like an obviously abusive filing pattern, Northern District judges remain reluctant to enter pre-filing orders without first running a full procedural-due-process exercise. That insistence on hearings and substantive findings — rooted in the Ninth Circuit’s case law — protects pro se litigants from premature restrictions but also requires defendants to do the procedural work to lay the foundation before seeking such relief.