California Case Summaries

Muradyan v. Warden — S.D. Cal. Denies Habeas Petition by Armenian Detainee Awaiting Third-Country Removal Within Zadvydas Six-Month Period

Unreported / Non-Citable

Case
Muradyan v. Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center
Court
U.S. District Court — Southern District of California
Date Decided
2026-01-23
Docket No.
3:26-cv-00063
Status
Unreported / Non-Citable
Topics
Section 2241 habeas, Zadvydas v. Davis, post-removal-period detention, six-month presumptively reasonable period, third-country removal, medical care

Background

Gevorg Muradyan is a native of Armenia who arrived in the United States in December 2024. An asylum officer made a positive reasonable-fear finding, and Muradyan was placed in removal proceedings and applied for asylum and withholding of removal. In September 2025, an immigration judge ordered him removed but granted withholding of removal to Armenia — meaning the United States cannot send him back to Armenia, but can remove him to a different country. Because Muradyan waived his right to appeal, the removal order became administratively final the same day.

Since then, Muradyan has been detained at the Otay Mesa Detention Center while ICE searches for a third country willing to receive him. As of January 2026, ICE had not obtained a travel document but represented that it was “diligently” looking and believed there was a “significant likelihood” of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Muradyan filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, arguing that his continued detention violated the Supreme Court’s Zadvydas v. Davis decision and also raising concerns about his medical care.

The Court’s Holding

The court denied the petition without prejudice but rejected several of the government’s arguments along the way.

On jurisdiction, the government argued that 8 U.S.C. § 1252 bars the court from reviewing his detention. The court squarely rejected that argument. Zadvydas itself held that § 2241 habeas remains available for statutory and constitutional challenges to post-removal-period detention. The court therefore had jurisdiction.

On the merits, the court held that Muradyan’s claim was not yet ripe. Detention after a final removal order is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), which provides a 90-day removal period followed by a longer period of presumptively reasonable detention under Zadvydas. Under Zadvydas, the petitioner has the initial burden of showing that he has been detained for more than six months — the presumptively reasonable period. Muradyan had been detained less than six months since his September 30, 2025 final order. The court therefore could not yet conclude that his detention was unreasonable, citing recent Southern District of California decisions (such as Khalilova v. Smith) that find pre-six-month petitions unripe.

The court also addressed Muradyan’s complaints about medical care. Citing the Supreme Court’s Muhammad v. Close decision, the court explained that complaints about “circumstances of confinement” — like medical care — must generally be brought as civil-rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, not as habeas petitions. Habeas is reserved for challenges to the validity or duration of confinement itself. The court therefore could not order release based on medical-care concerns.

The dismissal was without prejudice, allowing Muradyan to refile if he remains detained after the six-month presumptively reasonable window passes.

Key Takeaways

  • Zadvydas v. Davis sets a six-month presumptively reasonable period for post-removal detention. Habeas petitions filed before that period expires are generally not ripe and will be denied without prejudice.
  • Withholding of removal to a particular country (here, Armenia) does not bar removal to a different “third country.” The government has detention authority while it seeks a willing third-country destination.
  • Medical-care complaints in immigration detention belong in a civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, not in a § 2241 habeas petition. Habeas is for the legality and duration of confinement; § 1983 is for conditions of confinement.
  • 8 U.S.C. § 1252 does not strip district courts of habeas jurisdiction over post-removal-period detention claims. Zadvydas confirmed that statutory and constitutional challenges remain available through § 2241.

Why It Matters

Third-country removal cases — situations where a noncitizen has a final removal order but cannot be sent to his home country and the government must arrange removal to a third country — are a significant and growing category in California immigration practice. This decision shows the timing rules: ICE is given the first six months under Zadvydas to find a willing destination; only after that period does the burden begin to shift, and only after evidence that no removal is reasonably foreseeable does relief become realistic.

For California immigration detainees in this position, the practical message is to track the six-month milestone carefully and to gather evidence about removal infeasibility (for example, repeated unsuccessful third-country requests, country conditions making transfer impractical) for use in a renewed petition. For their advocates, the case is a reminder to separate habeas claims (about detention) from civil-rights claims (about conditions) and bring each in the appropriate vehicle.

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