Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Logan Dakota Kai Blömqvist and Todd Myers, proceeding pro se, sued Extra Space Storage, Inc. and related defendants alleging that they were being denied access to their respective storage units in Campbell and Los Gatos, California. They alleged the denial violated their leases and constituted discrimination on the basis of race and disability. They proceeded in forma pauperis and filed multiple TRO/preliminary injunction applications seeking immediate, unrestricted access to their units and email-only communications.
The court had previously screened an earlier version of the complaint, dismissed the § 1983 claim because Plaintiffs failed to allege joint action between the storage company and police, denied IFP-stage TRO relief, and granted leave to amend. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint asserting three federal causes of action under § 1983, ADA Title III (42 U.S.C. § 12181), and ADA retaliation (42 U.S.C. § 12203), plus various state-law theories. They also filed a renewed TRO application that the court converted into a motion for preliminary injunction.
The Court’s Holding
The court screened the amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and found that it states at least one cognizable claim — sufficient to satisfy IFP screening — but it dismissed the § 1983 claim and denied the preliminary injunction.
On the § 1983 claim, the court reaffirmed its earlier ruling that Plaintiffs had not pleaded the joint action with state actors that the statute requires. The amended complaint omitted the prior admissions that Plaintiffs themselves had repeatedly requested police presence, and instead alleged that “[p]olice assistance/refusal enabling a private lockout constitutes state action.” That conclusory allegation does not establish an agreement or meeting of the minds between Extra Space and the police, as required by Fonda v. Gray. The § 1983 claim was dismissed with what the court flagged as Plaintiffs’ final opportunity to amend.
On ADA Title III, however, the court — construing the pro se complaint liberally — found Plaintiffs adequately alleged a cognizable claim against the storage facility, which qualifies as a place of public accommodation. The ADA retaliation theory under § 12203 also survived screening. The court ordered service of the amended complaint on Extra Space.
On the preliminary injunction, the court applied the demanding Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council standard. Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits sufficient to support extraordinary preliminary relief, particularly given the procedural posture (defendants had not yet appeared and the screening process was just complete) and the questions about the strength of the disability-discrimination theory at this early stage. The motion was denied without prejudice to renewal once the case is more fully developed.
Key Takeaways
- Pro se plaintiffs alleging that private commercial actors and police acted jointly under § 1983 must plead specific facts showing an agreement or meeting of the minds, not merely that police declined to intervene against the private actor’s actions.
- Self-storage facilities are places of public accommodation subject to ADA Title III. Plaintiffs alleging accessibility-related denial of access can survive IFP screening with a properly pled theory.
- The Winter preliminary-injunction standard demands a likelihood of success on the merits. Cases that survive § 1915 screening do not automatically support preliminary relief; the merits showing is much more demanding.
- When pro se plaintiffs file successive TRO/PI applications, courts will routinely convert them into properly noticed PI motions and require defendants to be served before granting relief.
- Pro se plaintiffs are typically given multiple opportunities to amend before claims are dismissed with prejudice, but courts often signal when a particular round will be the last chance.
Why It Matters
Storage-unit access disputes are a common but underappreciated area of consumer litigation, and they sit at an interesting intersection of contract law, ADA Title III, and tenant-rights principles. This decision is one of relatively few in the Northern District to apply ADA Title III to a self-storage facility at the screening stage, and it illustrates the kind of detail courts will look for to allow such claims past IFP screening even on a pro se record.
The opinion is also a clean modern application of the Fonda v. Gray joint-action standard for § 1983 claims against private actors. Pro se plaintiffs frequently try to convert police non-intervention or police presence at scene into state action; courts continue to insist that the plaintiff plead specific agreement or meeting of the minds. The decision should be useful to any pro se litigant or counsel evaluating whether a private dispute against a commercial defendant can be federalized through § 1983.