Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Plaintiff Darwin Boggs sued defendant Hunter’s Nursery, LLC, asserting four state claims and a federal injunctive-relief claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The complaint alleged that Boggs “wishes to return and patronize Defendant’s business” but “is deterred . . . because his knowledge of [the alleged ADA] violations prevents him from returning until the barriers are removed.” The court found these allegations to be threadbare and boilerplate, and questioned whether Boggs had Article III standing to seek injunctive relief.
The Court’s Holding
Judge Kenly Kiya Kato issued an Order to Show Cause why the ADA claim should not be dismissed without prejudice for lack of Article III standing. Citing Moore v. Harper and the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Murthy v. Missouri, the court explained that to obtain forward-looking injunctive relief, an ADA plaintiff must establish a “substantial risk of future injury” — “a real and immediate threat of repeated injury.”
Under Langer v. Kiser and Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports, an ADA plaintiff meets this standard either by (1) showing currently being deterred from returning to the place of public accommodation because of a barrier, or (2) showing prior deterrence and an intent to return to the noncompliant accommodation. Boggs’s allegations were boilerplate and conclusory: he did not establish proximity of his residence to the business, regularity of visits to that area, or why he prefers Hunter’s Nursery over other comparable locations. The court ordered Boggs to appear at an in-person OSC hearing on January 20, 2026, to identify the specific facts establishing standing. Failure to comply would result in dismissal under Rule 41(b).
Key Takeaways
- For ADA injunctive-relief claims, plaintiffs must plausibly allege a “real and immediate threat of repeated injury” — not merely a vague desire to return (Murthy v. Missouri).
- Standing for ADA injunctive relief requires either (1) ongoing deterrence due to specific known barriers, or (2) prior deterrence plus a specific intent to return (Langer v. Kiser).
- Standing allegations require concrete facts: proximity of plaintiff’s residence to the business, regularity of visits to the area, and reasons for preferring this particular accommodation over alternatives.
- “Some day” intentions to return — without specific plans or timelines — do not satisfy Article III (Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife).
- Federal courts may sua sponte question Article III standing at any stage; the burden is on the plaintiff to establish standing on the merits.
Why It Matters
This is one of a series of OSC orders in the Central District scrutinizing the standing allegations of high-frequency or boilerplate ADA plaintiffs. The Supreme Court’s 2024 Murthy v. Missouri decision has tightened the “real and immediate threat” analysis, and Ninth Circuit precedent (Langer, Chapman) requires more than conclusory deterrence allegations.
For ADA plaintiffs’ counsel, the practical takeaway is to plead specific, particularized facts about the plaintiff’s relationship to the location: distance from home or work, history of visiting the area, and concrete plans to return. Generic “intent to return” allegations are now routinely insufficient.