Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Keng Jurai, a 40-year-old U.S. citizen of Thai origin with an MBA in project management and a Class B commercial driver’s license, applied for driver positions with Google through Storer Transportation Service and for many other Google positions between October 2022 and November 2025 — Program Manager, Data Center Security Manager, Technical Program Manager, and others — and was rejected from all of them. He had previously sued Google in 2024 (Case No. 3:24-cv-07984-LB), and the parties settled that case in May 2025. The court had granted Google’s prior motion to dismiss in this follow-on case on res judicata grounds, with leave to supplement based on new discriminatory acts.
Jurai supplemented with claims for discrimination and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII, and violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Google moved to dismiss, arguing that pre-settlement allegations were res judicata, that the Title VII and ADEA claims were barred for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and that the § 1981 claims failed to plead intentional discrimination or but-for causation.
The Court’s Holding
Magistrate Judge Laurel Beeler granted the motion. Pre-settlement allegations were barred by res judicata, as Jurai conceded. Title VII and ADEA claims were dismissed with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies: Jurai had not filed an EEOC charge naming the post-settlement incidents, and they were not “reasonably related” to the 2024 EEOC charge under B.K.B. v. Maui Police Department because they occurred at least 18 months later, with the EEOC investigation having ended one month after the May 2025 settlement. The continuing-violation doctrine did not apply because Jurai pleaded only isolated incidents, not a pattern, and discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time-barred under National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan and Cherosky v. Henderson.
The § 1981 discrimination claim was dismissed with one final opportunity to amend. Under Comcast Corp. v. National Association of African American-Owned Media, Jurai needed to plead intentional discrimination and that race was a but-for cause. His allegations that Google rejected him “but-for his Thai race” and his reliance on Google’s aggregated H-1B hiring statistics did not provide the kind of stark pattern unexplainable on race-neutral grounds that Williams v. McDonough requires. Nor did his MBA establish that he was qualified for every one of the 18+ non-driver positions he applied for. He may amend by February 2, 2026 with facts supporting both intentional discrimination and his qualifications. The § 1981 retaliation claim also failed because temporal proximity, the only causation theory advanced, was too attenuated under Clark County School District v. Breeden.
Key Takeaways
- Title VII and ADEA exhaustion is strict. New discriminatory acts that occur after the EEOC investigation closed, and that are months removed from the original charge, are not “reasonably related” and require their own administrative charge.
- The continuing-violation doctrine after National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan remains very narrow. Discrete failure-to-hire decisions are individually actionable and need their own timely charges.
- To plead a § 1981 claim after Comcast Corp., plaintiffs must allege facts supporting both intentional discrimination and but-for causation. Conclusory “but for my race” phrasing is not enough.
- Aggregate H-1B hiring statistics, without individualized circumstantial evidence and without a stark unexplainable disparity, do not establish a § 1981 prima facie case at the pleading stage.
- Plaintiffs claiming non-hire discrimination must plead specific qualifications for each position. A general MBA does not show qualification for 18+ different roles ranging from data-center security to technical program management.
Why It Matters
Failure-to-hire discrimination cases against major Bay Area tech employers are a steady part of the Northern District’s docket. This decision is a clear application of the post-Comcast § 1981 standard and the post-Morgan continuing-violation framework, both of which favor employers at the pleading stage when plaintiffs do not plead specific, plausible facts about intentional discrimination and qualifications.
For applicants and their counsel, the practical lessons are concrete: file a fresh EEOC charge for each meaningful new failure-to-hire incident; plead qualifications position-by-position; and pair statistical evidence with individualized circumstantial facts that suggest discriminatory intent. For employers, the case reinforces that aggressive res judicata, exhaustion, and Iqbal/Twombly-style arguments will succeed in the Northern District where the plaintiff’s factual narrative is built largely on conclusory race and statistical allegations.