Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Elizabeth Cruz and Hilarino Aparicio sued the City of San Diego, Police Chief David Nisleit, and three officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and California state law arising out of the November 13, 2023 fatal shooting of their son Imanol Aparicio. The plaintiffs allege that when officers encountered Imanol, he ran from them. Officers fired numerous gunshots. After the first bullet hit Imanol and he became incapacitated, officers continued firing shots into his body even though he was lying prone. The plaintiffs allege Imanol had a prior head injury that may have caused brain damage, that officers knew his identity and special needs, that no gun was pointed at officers, and that officers gave no adequate warning before deadly force was used.
The plaintiffs also assert Monell municipal-liability claims against the City and the police chief, alleging that San Diego police officers are trained in “combat shooting” — a policy of “emptying” their guns rather than first using non-lethal methods. They allege that California legislative findings concluded such policies result in excessive force and death, and that California amended state laws to direct officers to prefer non-lethal force, but San Diego continued to train officers in the contrary practice.
The defendants moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint and to strike portions as immaterial or scandalous.
The Court’s Holding
The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, allowing the core claims to proceed.
On the threshold judicial-notice question, the court took notice that the plaintiffs’ earlier complaints existed but rejected the defendants’ attempt to use prior pleadings as factual “admissions.” Under Ninth Circuit law (Ramirez v. County of San Bernardino), an amended complaint supersedes prior versions, which are treated as non-existent for substantive purposes.
On the substantive Section 1983 claims, the court allowed the Fourth Amendment excessive-force theory to proceed against the individual officers based on the SAC’s allegations that officers continued shooting at an incapacitated suspect lying prone — conduct that, accepted as true, plausibly violates clearly established Fourth Amendment limits on deadly force. The court found that the SAC’s allegations about no weapon being pointed at officers, lack of warning, and officers’ awareness of the decedent’s prior brain injury all supported the inference that the use of deadly force was excessive.
On Monell municipal liability, the court allowed the policy/custom theory to proceed based on the “combat shooting” training allegations and the legislative-findings allegations about California’s preference for non-lethal force. The plaintiffs adequately alleged that the City had an actionable policy of “emptying” firearms, that the City was aware the policy contributed to excessive force and death, and that the policy was the moving force behind Imanol’s killing.
The court dismissed certain other claims and granted the motion to strike in part as to specific allegations the court found impertinent or unnecessary, but the core wrongful-death and Monell claims survived to discovery.
Key Takeaways
- Continuing to fire shots at an incapacitated, prone suspect — even one who tried to flee — can violate clearly established Fourth Amendment limits on deadly force. Allegations of this kind survive a motion to dismiss.
- Monell claims based on a department-wide training policy can survive when the plaintiff identifies a specific allegedly unconstitutional practice (here, “combat shooting” / “emptying” the gun) and ties it to legislative findings or other indicators that the practice causes constitutional violations.
- Earlier-filed complaints are superseded by amended complaints and cannot be used as factual “admissions” against the plaintiff. Defendants who try to use prior pleadings should expect courts to take judicial notice of their existence but not their contents.
- Even after a successful motion to dismiss is filed, plaintiffs in police-shooting cases should re-plead with care and attention to the specific elements of Fourth Amendment excessive force and Monell liability.
Why It Matters
Police-shooting wrongful-death cases are an active and contested area of California civil-rights litigation. This decision is a useful illustration of how these cases survive at the pleading stage when the complaint includes allegations of continued shooting after incapacitation, lack of warning, and a department-wide training policy that allegedly drives excessive use of deadly force.
For California municipal defendants, the case shows that thorough motions to dismiss may trim claims at the margins but rarely defeat the core Fourth Amendment and Monell theories when the SAC includes specific factual allegations about post-incapacitation shooting and department-wide training failures. For families and civil-rights counsel, the case is a useful template for pleading both the individual-officer Fourth Amendment claim and the Monell training-policy claim in police-shooting cases.