Reported / Citable
Background
Alonzo Devon Melson was charged with first degree murder, attempted murder, and related firearm offenses arising out of a January 2017 gang-related shooting in the Watts neighborhood of Los Angeles. The prosecution’s theory was that Melson, a member of the Hacienda Village Bloods, shot a man associated with a rival Hispanic gang. The case turned almost entirely on identification testimony from two eyewitnesses: a passenger in the victim’s car and a neighbor.
Melson’s first trial ended in a hung jury, with three jurors voting to acquit. At the retrial, both eyewitnesses bolstered their identification of Melson with new statements claiming they had identified him to police shortly after the shooting. Those statements were demonstrably false; police records showed the witnesses had been hesitant or had failed to identify Melson when first interviewed. The prosecutor, who had access to the police reports, did not correct the testimony and instead repeated one of the false statements during closing argument. Melson’s retrial counsel did not impeach the witnesses with their actual prior statements and the file showed no notes or copies of the police interviews.
Melson was convicted at the retrial. After his direct appeal, he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging Napue error (a prosecutor’s failure to correct false testimony) and ineffective assistance of counsel.
The Court’s Holding
The Second District Court of Appeal, Division One, granted the writ and vacated Melson’s conviction. The court held that the prosecutor committed Napue error by failing to correct the eyewitnesses’ false statements about their prior police identifications and by repeating one of those statements as evidence of guilt during closing argument. Under Napue v. Illinois and the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Glossip v. Oklahoma, prosecutors have a constitutional obligation to correct testimony they know or should know to be false.
Materiality of the Napue error is presumed. To uphold the conviction, the People had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the false testimony could not have contributed to the verdict. The court emphasized that this is not a sufficiency-of-the-evidence test; even where other evidence supports guilt, the question is only whether the false testimony might have influenced the jury. Given that the first trial had hung and the false statements bolstered the only direct identification evidence, the People could not meet that burden.
The court separately found ineffective assistance of counsel. Defense counsel’s failure to impeach the witnesses with their actual prior statements was not strategic; counsel’s file lacked basic preparation materials, including the police interview transcripts. This deficient performance prejudiced Melson under the Strickland standard.
Key Takeaways
- Prosecutors must correct false testimony from their own witnesses, even when the falsity emerges spontaneously at trial. Failure to do so is structural error under Napue and Glossip.
- Materiality of Napue error is presumed. The People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the false testimony did not contribute to the verdict—a standard distinct from harmless error or sufficiency review.
- Defense counsel’s failure to obtain, review, and use prior statements of key prosecution witnesses can constitute ineffective assistance, particularly where the file shows no preparation materials.
- Hung juries in earlier trials are powerful evidence of materiality. When a first trial ends close to acquittal, even modest improvements to the prosecution’s case in a retrial can alter the outcome.
- Glossip v. Oklahoma signals a renewed Supreme Court emphasis on prosecutors’ Napue duties, and California courts will apply it rigorously in postconviction review.
Why It Matters
Coming on the heels of the Supreme Court’s 2025 Glossip decision, this opinion reinforces that California courts will closely scrutinize identification cases where eyewitness testimony shifts between trials and where defense counsel fails to use available impeachment material. Prosecutors should prepare witnesses carefully, review prior statements with them in advance, and immediately correct misstatements about earlier identifications.
For criminal defense lawyers, the case is a stark reminder that thorough preparation requires obtaining and reviewing every prior statement of key prosecution witnesses, especially in retrials where the witness’s account may have evolved. For habeas counsel, the decision demonstrates that the combination of Napue error and ineffective assistance can be a powerful vehicle for postconviction relief in cases that turn on contested identifications.