Reported / Citable
Background
The Santa Susana Field Laboratory in Ventura County was the site of decades of liquid-rocket engine and nuclear research, leaving widespread chemical and radioactive contamination. Cleanup is split between federal and state authorities, with California’s Department of Toxic Substances Control (DTSC) overseeing chemical remediation under two consent orders. When Boeing announced plans to demolish several buildings in Area IV, an environmental group, Physicians for Social Responsibility – Los Angeles, sued DTSC in 2013, claiming the agency had to conduct a California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) review of the demolition activity.
The trial court denied the writ petition, and in a 2023 unpublished opinion the Court of Appeal affirmed. The court held that the Area IV building demolition was a private activity within Boeing’s discretion that was not subject to discretionary approval by a public agency, so it was not a CEQA project. The California Supreme Court denied review. Months later, DTSC released its final Environmental Impact Report on the site cleanup and, while reaffirming that the demolition was not a CEQA-triggering project, voluntarily included a quantitative analysis of the demolition impacts in its final EIR.
The plaintiffs returned to the trial court and sought attorney fees as a successful party under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, the private attorney general statute. They argued that even though they lost on the merits, their lawsuit was the catalyst for DTSC’s decision to study the demolition impacts in the final EIR. The trial court rejected the request, and the plaintiffs appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed. To recover under section 1021.5, a plaintiff must show, among other things, that it was a successful party. A plaintiff who loses on the merits can still qualify under the catalyst theory if the litigation prompted the defendant to change its conduct in a way that produced the relief sought. But the plaintiff must show that the lawsuit had merit and that the change was the result of pressure from the litigation, not merely a coincidental policy shift.
The court found neither requirement was met here. First, the plaintiffs did not have a meritorious case on the demolition issue. Two courts had already concluded that the demolition was not subject to CEQA, and the plaintiffs offered nothing new to overturn that conclusion. The fact that DTSC chose to include the demolition in the EIR analysis after the lawsuit ended did not change the legal merits of what the plaintiffs had argued.
Second, there was no causal connection between the lawsuit and DTSC’s decision. By the time the final EIR was issued, the litigation was nearly ten years old, the trial court and the Court of Appeal had rejected every theory, and review had been denied. DTSC was not under any threat of judicial compulsion. The court held that the underlying public policy of section 1021.5, preventing defendants from mooting meritorious cases by voluntary action just before judgment, was not implicated when the agency acted long after fully prevailing in court.
Key Takeaways
- The catalyst theory under section 1021.5 still requires the plaintiff to show its litigation position was meritorious, even though no judgment in its favor was entered.
- Voluntary action by a public agency long after the agency has won at every level of court will not support a catalyst-based fee award.
- Plaintiffs cannot bridge the merits gap with policy arguments about the public benefit of the agency’s eventual decision.
- Demolition activities undertaken by a private property owner without discretionary government approval are generally outside CEQA, even when they occur on a contaminated site under regulatory oversight.
- Attorney fee motions in long-running environmental cases should be timed and supported with evidence of a tight causal link between the lawsuit and the relief obtained.
Why It Matters
This decision sets a clear limit on the catalyst theory that environmental and consumer groups frequently rely on after losing the underlying case. Without proof that the lawsuit had merit and was the actual driver of the agency’s change in conduct, fees cannot be awarded simply because the agency later took action that aligns with the plaintiff’s policy goals. Public-interest litigants need to be careful about pursuing fee petitions where they have suffered an unequivocal loss on the merits.
For state agencies, the case offers some assurance that they can update their environmental analyses or supplement their EIRs after winning litigation without triggering fee exposure. The opinion is also a useful reference on the boundaries of CEQA’s reach over private demolition activity that is regulated by other environmental laws but is not the product of a discretionary public agency approval.