Reported / Citable
Background
Shevon Harrington received federal housing assistance under Section 8 administered by the Housing Authority of Riverside County. After she was the subject of an unlawful detainer judgment in superior court, the Housing Authority issued a notice that it intended to terminate her assistance. The federal regulations require termination if a participant is evicted for serious or repeated lease violations, and they also list a series of optional “family obligations” that may justify discretionary termination.
At Harrington’s administrative hearing, the only issue actually litigated was the eviction-based mandatory termination. The hearing officer concluded that termination was required because the unlawful detainer judgment had been upheld on appeal. That was wrong on the facts: the appeal was still pending, and the appellate division of the Riverside County Superior Court later reversed the eviction for insufficient evidence.
Harrington filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. The trial court agreed that the hearing officer’s findings were not supported by the record, but invoked the “independent judgment” standard of review to look at the entire administrative file and identified what it described as three additional violations of the family obligations. On that basis, the trial court upheld the termination as a permissible exercise of discretion, even though those grounds had not been considered by the hearing officer.
The Court’s Holding
The Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division Two, reversed and ordered the trial court to grant the writ. The court explained that section 1094.5 requires the reviewing court to evaluate the agency’s findings and decision, not to make new factual determinations of its own. Even under the independent judgment standard, the court’s job is to weigh the evidence the agency considered against the agency’s own findings, not to identify alternative grounds the agency itself never adopted.
Because the only ground for termination addressed at the hearing was mandatory termination based on an eviction judgment that had since been reversed, there were no longer any supported findings to uphold. The Housing Authority conceded the trial court’s analytical error but argued the judgment could be affirmed on the “family obligation” grounds the trial court identified. The Court of Appeal rejected that approach because those grounds were never the subject of an administrative hearing. Allowing the agency to defend its decision based on grounds the participant had no opportunity to contest would violate basic due process.
The court declined to remand to the agency for further findings, observing that the hearing officer’s findings were not vague or incomplete; they were simply not supported by the record. Because the unlawful detainer judgment had been reversed and there were no other surviving grounds for termination, the proper remedy was a peremptory writ directing the Housing Authority to vacate the termination.
Key Takeaways
- Administrative mandamus review under section 1094.5, even with independent judgment, is bounded by the grounds the agency itself decided; courts cannot uphold a decision on alternative grounds the agency never adopted.
- A Section 8 participant facing termination is entitled to notice and an administrative hearing on the specific grounds the housing authority relies on. New grounds raised for the first time in court raise serious due process concerns.
- When an unlawful detainer judgment is later reversed, mandatory Section 8 termination based on that eviction collapses with the judgment.
- Remand to the agency is appropriate only when findings are missing or unclear, not when the existing findings are unsupported by the evidence.
- Pro per litigants in administrative mandamus actions can prevail; the court here ordered fees on appeal to a self-represented Section 8 participant.
Why It Matters
Section 8 termination decisions can have devastating effects on low-income households. The opinion is a clear reminder to housing authorities that they must articulate the specific grounds for termination at the administrative hearing and develop the record to support those grounds. Trial courts cannot rescue an agency decision by sifting through the file and identifying grounds the agency never considered.
For administrative law practitioners more broadly, the decision is a useful illustration of how independent judgment review actually works. The reviewing court still has to start with the agency’s findings; it does not become a freestanding fact finder. When agencies want to rely on multiple, alternative grounds for an adverse action, they should make sure each one is identified in the notice, addressed at the hearing, and supported by findings in the written decision.